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SUMMARY
Severe weather events such as storms, flooding and extreme temperatures have been oc-
curring across the United States and the world in recent years, increasingly threatening
places where large populations and economic activities are heavily concentrated [3–6].
Among the most affected are the energy infrastructure and services to customers, where
weather-induced failures have affected millions of people for days [4, 7, 8]. In response to
these disruptions, nation-wide efforts have been initiated on resilience [4, 6, 8–10]. Here
resilience refers to the ability to reduce failures under external disruptions and to recover
rapidly once failures occur [4, 6, 10].
However, as pointed out by the taskforce report [10], the current understanding of re-
silience is limited for the power infrastructure under severe weather. It is largely unknown
how resilient our infrastructure really is to severe weather [4]. In fact, the problem is not just
about fixing the physical infrastructure. Services (i.e., electricity supplies to customers) are
pertinent that involve users, service providers (i.e., distribution system operators, or DSOs)
and policy makers [11].
This thesis studies the challenging issues to date on resilience. The focus is on how to
quantify resilience of the energy infrastructure and services to customers. Here the infras-
tructure refers to power distribution grids that deliver electricity directly to users. Power
distribution grids are found particularly vulnerable to severe weather disruptions, where
90% of failures have occurred [6]. Furthermore, the current power distribution infrastruc-
ture is not yet fully equipped with the state-of-art technologies for efficient monitoring and
protection [12–14]. Services at power distribution grids that involve a large number of
customers in disjoint service regions managed by disparate distribution system operators
and regulators are particularly challenging. A severe weather event can have a wide geo-
graphical span. For example, Super Storm Sandy affected eight million customers in 21
DSO service regions in the United States. In the face of these issues, quantifying resilience
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remains a challenging problem, involving both infrastructure and services [4, 11, 15–17].
Notably, resilience centers on complex networks involving weather, the power distribu-
tion infrastructure, customers and service providers [4, 6]. The failure aspect of resilience
relates to the interactions between the physical infrastructure and weather. The recovery
aspect relates mainly to services. Services depend on complex factors, not only the infras-
tructure but also DSOs, customers and policies. Both aspects require advanced modeling
to incorporate a large number of dependent variables, and data analysis to gain knowledge
about what determines resilience.
In particular, this thesis identifies and studies three technical challenges: stochasticity,
data analytics, and resilience metrics (preliminary). The contributions can be summarized
as follows.
A first challenge is how to model complex dependences among failures at the infras-
tructure, recoveries by service providers governed by policies, and impacts on customers,
both at a fine granularity and large scale. This work has developed spatiotemporal models
and novel formulation for dependent failures and recoveries based on non-stationary ran-
dom processes [11,16,18,19]. Assume that failures have already been detected. The model
is derived from bottom up, relating individual failures with outages (losses of power but
without being damaged) and dynamic network topology. Radial topology, commonly-used
in power distribution grids, is incorporated explicitly, although the mathematical model is
applicable to other types of topologies. The resulting model thus incorporates multiple
spatiotemporal scales that span a distribution system locally and service areas regionally,
from sub-seconds for outages, minutes or hours for weather-induced failures, and hours or
days for recovery [11, 16, 18].
A second challenge is data analytics that can learn how resilient the infrastructure and
services really are from measurements. The power industry has been collecting data on
failures and restoration. Such data can potentially be turned into knowledge to guide re-
silience study. A challenge is the availability of detailed data at a large scale across multiple
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service territories. As data are owned by DSOs, large-scale analytics calls for active par-
ticipation of DSOs and policy makers. This work has used granular data from five DSOs,
one at Louisiana and four at upstate New York. The data represent the state of art of exist-
ing collection methods, where distribution system operators (DSOs) have taken great care
to ensure measurement accuracy. However the data are not from emerging technologies
such as advanced metering infrastructures nor PMUs. Using such measurements, the thesis
shows that data analytics can provide insights and quantification beyond experiences. In
particular, the data analytics has found that local power failures have a disproportionally
large non-local impact on customers, where top 20% failures affected 80% customers dur-
ing severe weather events and daily operations. In contrast, an aggregation of small disrup-
tions and commonplace devices result in major cost in customer downtime, where bottom
89% failures that affected 34 customers amount to 56% of the total cost. Importantly, such
findings are also obtained from data during daily operations. Therefore, extreme weather
does not cause but exacerbates the vulnerabilities in daily operations.
Finally, a third challenge is how to measure resilience in a way that incorporates the
infrastructure, services, customers and weather. Such resilience metrics are needed for
quantifying threats and system-wide performance. The thesis has identified and analyzed
the insufficiency of the existing metrics that are widely applied by industry, and derived
as a preliminary study, a dynamic metric that incorporates the intrinsic characteristics of
failures, recoveries and impacts on customers. Conditioning on the external disruption
impacts and existing utility service, the thesis estimated the system resilience using data in





Power distribution system lies at the edge of the energy grid, delivering medium and low
voltages to residence and industry customers [20]. Distribution system consists of leaf
nodes of the energy infrastructure, where populated electric equipments and customers are
clustered and exposed in large geographical area. Power distribution is thus susceptible
to severe weather events, such as hurricanes, flooding, and extreme temperature [4, 6, 10].
Severe weather events have been occurring more frequently in the U.S. in recent years
and resulted in millions of customers without electricity for days [21]. How to improve
the resilience of power distribution systems to large-scale external disruptions from se-
vere weather has become a fundamental research issue. Resilience here corresponds to the
ability of the system to avoid power failures and to recover rapidly from failures [4, 10].
However, the current understanding on resilience is still limited for the power infrastructure
under severe weather.
The focus of the work is to model and learn the resilience of power distribution under
severe weather systematically [16, 18, 22]. Multiple factors are involved, such as the phys-
ical infrastructure, the exogenous weather, and the services to electric customers. Unique
challenges emerge for quantifying how power distributions respond to the large-scale ex-
ternal disruptions.
The first challenge is stochasticity. The exogenous weather impact, such as the evo-
lution of hurricanes, exhibits random behaviors. This results in the dynamic (i.e., random
and non-stationary) power failures that occur at power distribution [16]. The restorations
also exhibit dynamics as they are highly correlated with power failures [16]. Hence, non-
stationarity is an intrinsic characteristic of large-scale failures and recoveries at power dis-
tribution. Stochastic models are thus needed to include generic characteristics of failure,
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recovery, and network structures [16, 18].
The second challenge is the resilience of power distribution. Resilience is a system
measure of power distribution, manifesting itself in two major aspects [22, 23]. One is
the ability for the system to avoid failures, which relates to the physical infrastructure
and exogenous weather impact [22]. The other is the ability for the system to recover
rapidly from failures, which concerns the services to customers [22]. Existing works are
not sufficient to characterizing all the pertinent factors, and new models and metrics are
required [22].
The third challenge is the computational methods and large-scale real data. Real data
is needed for estimating unknown model parameters, so models and real data together can
assess the resilience. Recent works have shown the strength of combining algorithmic
approaches with real data [24, 25]. However, lack of data is a common problem for the
study [26]. One severe weather event, such as a hurricane, generates only one sample,
i.e., one snap-shot of failures and recoveries of power distribution [16]. The accuracy and
resolution of real data is another problem. Data was aggregated spatially and temporally
in previous works [24,27], so the information is missing at components and the small time
scale of minutes. How to use real data to enable the learning of models from individual
component up to the entire system is a major issue.
These three aspects are inter-related as illustrated in Fig. 1.1. Modeling lays a foun-
dation to guide data analytics (i.e., on what simple quantities to evaluate from complex
failure and recovery processes, and what data to use to gain knowledge on resilience).
Meanwhile, modeling provides a basis from which resilience metrics can be derived as
system-wide performance. Data analytics provides knowledge and insights on resilience
of operational distribution grids and services. Data also underlay measures of resilience
metrics and model parameters. Such knowledge should in turn improve modeling and data
analytics.
The quantification of resilience depends on characterization of the performance of
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Figure 1.1: Illustration of three inter-related challenges.
power systems. Resilience can be understood as the ability of the power systems to avoid or
reduce power failures and to recover quickly after failure occurrences. These two aspects
are inter-related through the concepts of resilience across multiple spatiotemporal scales as
stated below.
1.1.1 Infrastructure
A first aspect of resilience is that of reducing failures in the energy infrastructure. Here,
as noted above, the infrastructure refers to power distribution systems, the last stage of
the grid [28]. Severe weather events (e.g., high winds and flooding) damage power com-
ponents such as down-wires from fallen debris, damaged transformers or non-functional
distribution substations. Component failures in a power distribution system are local (i.e.,
do not cascade for radial topology) but can involve large numbers of customers and span a
wide geographical area [29]. Protective devices, activated by failures or fault currents, are
also considered as infrastructural failures since they interrupt electricity supplies to cus-
tomers [28]. Examples of activated protective devices include open switches and blown
fuses [30]. Outages are further caused by failures within a distribution system, where de-
vices downstream lose power but are not damaged [11, 18].
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1.1.2 Services
The second aspect of resilience relates to services (i.e., maintaining electricity supplies to
customers). Recovery from failures thus signifies the service aspect of resilience. DSOs are
responsible for restoring electricity supplies to customers when disruptions occur. Thus,
services are provided in a decentralized fashion, where individual DSOs are responsible
for their own managed territories. Services are also governed by policies in the form of
guidelines from state and federal governments [31]. Policy makers also participate actively
in recovery processes (i.e., help guide restoration crews as shown in Super Storm Sandy
and Hurricane Matthew). Hence customers, DSOs and policy makers form a community
relevant to resilient energy services.
1.1.3 Multiple Spatiotemporal Scales
Resilience involves interactions among power distribution grids, services to customers, the
community and weather as illustrated in Fig. 1.2. Such interactions occur dynamically
across multiple spatiotemporal scales. For example, high winds cause fallen debris that in-
duce failures to overhead power distribution lines in minutes [16]. Outages caused by fail-
ures occur in seconds or sub-seconds within a distribution infrastructure [18,32]. Recovery
occurs in seconds for restoring outages and in days for difficult manual repairs [11, 16].
Spatial scales vary from components in a local distribution system to townships, one ser-
vice region and multiple service territories [33].
1.2 Literature Review
1.2.1 Power Distribution
An electric power grid is an interconnected network that delivers electricity to customers,
which typically consists three part: power generation, power transmission, and power dis-
tribution [20]. Figure 1.3 shows a simplified diagram of power grid. Power distribution lies
at the edge of the electric grid, and provides medium and low voltages (35KV to 120V)
from substations to customers as the final stage [20]. Power grid is susceptible to severe
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Figure 1.2: Illustration of interactions among weather, infrastructure, and community.
weather events, such as hurricanes, ice storms, and flooding. As reported, 58% of total
disruptions of electricity services were due to severe weather, and 87% of each such failure
event affected 50,000 customers or more since 2002 [6]. Especially, about 90% of the total
failures occurred at power distribution [6]. Hence, power distribution is more vulnerable to
severe weather than power generation and transmission.
The vulnerability of power distribution is due to its unique characteristics compared
to power transmission. First of all, there are significantly more miles of power distribution
that are exposed to severe weather than transmission. For example, Georgia Power has over
154,000 miles of distribution lines, but has only 27,000 miles of transmission lines [34].
Second, power distribution consists of widely-distributed electric devices. The devices
are often mounted on poles and are exposed to external threats such as fallen trees under
high winds [28, 35]. Third, power distribution is not designed as reliable as generation or
transmission [27]. For example, overhead distribution lines are typically strung between
poles that are 30 to 40 ft high and 100 to 200 ft apart, and such height and distance are
susceptible to fallen trees [35].
Power distribution is classified to overhead distribution and underground distribution.
Overhead distribution is used for about 80% of power distribution in U.S., [28]. High wind
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Figure 1.3: Diagram of typical electric power grid: generation, transmission and distribu-
tion [1, 2].
is the major threat to the overhead system. A radial topology is typical for overhead dis-
tribution for the simplicity and low cost [1], but radial topology can result in correlated
outages to electric devices and customers [18]. Underground networks keep power lines
and equipment buried and are more resilient to high winds [4]. But underground distribu-
tion is susceptible to surge, flooding and salt water damages [3, 6].
1.2.2 Modeling
An objective of modeling is to characterize relationships among a large number of depen-
dent variables. Such variables include weather, failures at the distribution grid level, recov-
eries, impacts on customers and the community overall. To date, there does not exist such
a model that incorporates all these pertinent factors. Different aspects have been studied in
prior work, from static models to non-stationary spatiotemporal random processes.
1.2.2.1 Static Models in Machine Learning
A large body of prior work addresses the modeling of how severe weather induces initiat-
ing failures [30, 36–38]. These models are static, focusing on finding a mapping between
weather variables and failures. Such models pioneered the work in this area, starting with
one node (e.g., a power distribution line or a component), and one to multiple weather vari-
ables [24,30,37]. For example, the failure rate, which is the average number of new failures
occurring per mile per hour of overhead power lines, is modeled as a quadratic function of
wind intensity in [28]. Fragility, which is the conditional probability of a component failure
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Figure 1.4: Machine Learning View of Static Models.
given weather variables, is modeled as a function of wind intensity or gust, precipitation,
and surge elevation respectively in [39] and [40].
These models, although diverse, can be unified through machine learning as illustrated
in Fig. 1.4. Consider an n-dimensional vector of exogenous variables x ∈ Rn at a given
location for 1 ≤ n. Modeling can be viewed as finding a static mapping, f (x; a) : x → y,
between exogenous variables x and targets y ∈ Rm for 1 ≤ m. Here y describes failures
(i.e., as the number of failures or failure durations, or the probability of failures/durations),
and a ∈ Rl is a vector of unknown parameters for 1 ≤ l. The data set D = {x(k), y(k)} is
obtained on pairs of exogenous and failure variables, where (x(k), y(k)) are the k-th sample
of the exogenous input x and desired output y of the learning machine. The goal of learning
is to obtain either f or the parameter a for a chosen f using data D so that f approximates
an underlying mapping from x to y. This is clearly a context of supervised learning [41].
The models are static, where neither f nor the parameters a nor the inputs and outputs (x, y)
vary with time.
The input variables x mainly represent weather, including wind-intensity, speed and
gust; as well as precipitation. Several example models on f have been studied:
(a) Poisson generalized linear model (GLM) [27]: The number of power failures in a
grid cell is modeled as a Poisson random variable with mean µ, where ln(µ) is assumed to
be a linear function of weather variables x.
(b) Negative binomial generalized linear model (NBGLM) [30]: An error term ε is
introduced into the GLM to model the dispersion (i.e., the inconsistency between the mean
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and the variance).
(c) Generalized additive model (GAM) [24]: The linear function is replaced by a non-
linear mapping f , including cubic splines and non-parametric models.
(d) Spatially dependent Poisson linear models [42]: Spatial correlation is included in
GLM as a multivariate normal distribution across different grid cells.
The above models have been used widely in subsequent works [43–46]. Resulting
models identify fallen trees as major causes of power failures [30, 47]; and transformers as
affected most by severe storms [27, 43].
Other learning methods have been applied, including classification and regression trees,
Bayesian additive regression trees, and multivariate adaptive regression splines [37]. Bayesian
additive regression trees are found to be most accurate in predicting durations of failures
given weather variables [37]. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is found to be effective
in learning from correlated weather variables [43].
The static models assume that failures occur independently of time and locations [30,
42]. This assumption on temporal independence is reasonable if evolution of failures is
not considered. The assumption on spatial independence can be invalid since locations
at sufficiently close proximities may experience similar weather impacts [42]. In addition,
certain geo-locations exhibit a higher likelihood of weather-induced failures than the others
[4]. Due to these assumptions, certain static models are obtained by aggregating over time
and service regions [30]. However, the aggregation may lose spatiotemporal information
needed for failure and recovery studies (see Section IV for further discussions).
1.2.2.2 Spatiotemporal Random Processes
When sufficiently fine spatial and temporal scales are taken into consideration, failures
and recoveries need to be modeled as spatiotemporal random processes [11, 16, 48–50].
Such models characterize dynamic interactions of infrastructural failures, services and cus-
tomers, which are not quantified by static models [11, 16].
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The prior works motivate such modeling albeit the problem they consider is on cas-
cading failures that occur at power transmission rather than distribution grids [51, 52]. For
example, dynamic models are developed for cascading failures through Branching pro-
cesses [51, 53], Markov decision processes [54], hybrid system models for random and
sporadic failures [55], and other probabilistic temporal models (see [56–58] and references
therein).
These models are based on stationary probability distributions while weather-induced
failure-recovery processes are non-stationary [11, 16]. Furthermore, severe-weather in-
duced disruptions span a wide geographical area. Therefore, spatiotemporal processes are
needed for weather-induced failures and recoveries.
Some recent work has developed a spatiotemporal non-stationary model for dependent
failure-recovery processes [16,18]. This model is motivated by non-stationary queues [59].
Such models have been applied to failure-recovery processes from severe weather events
[16, 19]. However, the queuing model is inapplicable when a finer spatiotemporal scale
is considered for impacts on customers by each failure and recovery; and restoration is
conducted with priorities for critical customers [60].
A formulation is then developed from bottom-up, starting with failures at the power
distribution infrastructure, incorporating service recovery through failure durations, and
impacts on customers [11]. Such models integrate a large number of interdependent vari-
ables at the finest spatiotemporal scale.
To consider this model, assume failures are already detected. I(d)i (t) (d = f , o) is an
indicator function, representing a failure ( f ) or an outage (o) for I(d)i (t) = 1; otherwise,
I(d)i (t) = 0. i includes the type, geo-location and system-location of device i. Service is
characterized by how rapidly power supply is restored to customers [4]; thus represented
by downtime duration Di(v) for failure or outage i that occurs at time v. An indicator
function I[Di(v) > t − v] represents the recovery event, where failure or outage i is not yet
recovered at t, 0 < v < t. Finally, the impact to customers evaluated at time t is modeled via
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a function Gi(v, t) for disruption i, which occurs at time v for v < t. As a simple example,
Gi(v, t) is the customer downtime resulting from failure or outage i.
Failures, outages, recoveries and costs are dependent for a given weather event, evolv-
ing in time and locations. Incorporating randomness from weather disruptions, the spa-
tiotemporal non-stationary random processes model a collection of dependent infrastruc-
tural failures, recoveries and costs as coupled processes:
(a) Failure (and outage): {I(d)i (v), i ∈ S (v), v > 0},
(b) Recovery: {I[Dk(v) > t − v], k ∈ S (t), 0 < v < t},
(c) Cost: {G j(v, t), j ∈ S (v), 0 < v < t}.
Here, S (v) and S (t) consist of nodes in normal operation at time v and disruptions at
time t, respectively. While such a model starts from the finest spatial scale of individual
components and customers, aggregation can be done to an area, a township, one service
region and multiple DSO territories as illustrated in Fig. 1.2.
Quantifying completely the spatiotemporal non-stationary random processes is pro-
hibitive since that requires joint probability distributions at all time epochs. The first mo-
ments are used in an initial effort, including the time-varying failure rates and marginal
conditional probability of downtime duration given failure occurrence time [11].
1.2.3 Resilience of Power Distribution
1.2.3.1 Resilience Concepts
Resilience is a system measure in response to exogenous disruptions. Here a system cor-
responds to large-scale power distribution, and exogenous disruptions are severe weather
events. Definitions and approaches on resilience are extensible beyond power distribu-
tion under severe weather [23]. Various definitions have been provided previously (for
example, [4, 6, 29, 61], just to name a few). Despite the differences in terminologies, the
definitions share a common concept that resilience is the capacity of a system to adapt to
changes from environments and the climate [6]. In relating to severe weather disruptions
of the infrastructure, resilience is defined through the two aspects:
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• The ability to avoid failures under exogenous disruptions,
• The ability to restore services rapidly if failures occur.
Industry adopts similar definitions of resilience, with an emphasis on providing seamless
services to customers. Rapid recovery from damages is the focus of power utilities in the
U.S. [31, 62]. This corresponds to the second aspect of resilience. The first aspect is often
related to as hardening the power grid [31]. Hence, resilience adopted by power utilities
also involves two aspects.
Resilience is a dynamic measure for the system performance in major disruptions. Dis-
tributed backup resources and highly flexible new loads are designed and installed, which
makes today’s power distribution system more dynamic [63]. The dynamic infrastructure
further results in the dynamic system performance that evolves with environment changes,
and finally the dynamic system resilience [6].
1.2.3.2 Resilience Metrics
Most of existing resilience metrics are static metrics, which characterize the average mea-
sures of system performance. Power utilities use widely the IEEE defined standard sustained-
interruption indices, such as System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI) and
System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) [64]. SAIFI/SAIDI characterize the
system reliability in daily operations excluding major storm events [64]. To evaluate the
severe weather events, SAIFI was revised to Storm Average Interruption Frequency In-
dex (STAIFI) [65], and SAIDI was revised to Storm Average Interruption Duration Index
(STAIDI) [66]. They both aggregate the number of interrupted customers and customer
interruption durations over an entire major storm. As the result, STAIFI/STAIDI have large
errors for major storms [22].
Estimated Time of Restoration (ETR) is also widely used by power utilities, which is
provided to the customers informing the expected time needed for restoring electricity ser-
vices after failure occurrences [62]. Fragility is another static metric, which characterizes
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the first ability of reducing failures. Variations of fragility can be found in [45, 65, 67–69].
Conceptually, fragility is the conditional probability or frequency of interruptions given
exogenous variables. As the static metrics reflect only the global system resilience in ag-
gregation over time and locations, they are insufficient to capture the dynamics and non-
stationarity of the resilience.
Dynamic metrics have been studied less previously. A metric called “quality”, or “loss
function”, is a dynamic metric that characterizes over time the percentage of either an oper-
ational system [70] or the number of customers with normal service [23]. Several variations
were defined based on the metric, such as “robustness” and “rapidity” [39, 71]. Although
the time variable t is involved, these metrics fails to characterize the dynamic resilience ei-
ther. First, the dynamic topology of power distributions is opaque. Second, mapping from
weather variables is missing. Expressing by pre-assumed stationary parametric functions,
they cannot reflect the actual evolution of failures and recoveries. Involving time variable t
only is far from sufficient.
1.2.4 Non-Stationary Learning
Smart power grid is an emerging area for new applications of machine learning in a non-
stationary environment. Such a non-stationary environment emerges when large-scale fail-
ures occur at power distribution networks due to external disruptions such as hurricanes
and severe storms. Non-stationary random processes have been studied in the context of
drifting concepts (see [72–74] and references therein). Samples for learning thus need to
be dynamically drawn from a non-stationary environment. An issue of sample size arises
whether data is sufficient for characterizing underlying drifts of distributions. On-line learn-
ing algorithms have been developed to identify a drift, to collect and learn from samples
accordingly [75].
The problem of learning non-stationary processes exhibits unique challenges in terms
of sample size. For simplicity, batch data is assumed to be collected for learning an entire
non-stationary life cycle of failure and recovery processes. This setting allows off-line
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learning of a non-stationary random process, which is usually easier than on-line learning.
However, a challenge here is that data is insufficient for even off-line learning. There is only
one snapshot of a distribution network in space and time from one external disturbance.
Therefore, combining model-based and data-driven approaches becomes important, where
data can be used to learn a small number of model-parameters [76].
Combining model-based and data-driven approaches for learning is also required by the
problem here. There has been tremendous work on learning spatial-temporal data over the
years (see [77] and [78] as examples). Most of these learning approaches are data-centric,
i.e., aiming at modeling and extracting information directly from data. The problem studied
in this work is on power distribution networks. Thus, learning approaches need to explain,
i.e., to model network behaviors upon external disturbances. Identifying models of network
behaviors then becomes a pre-requisite for learning. Learned models or model-parameters
can provide insights on network behaviors under external disruptions.
1.2.5 Data Analytics
Data analytics learn knowledge from measurements on failures, recoveries and weather
variables. Knowledge learned helps to answer such questions as how resilient the infras-
tructure and services really are; and what governs resilience or the lack thereof. Here
modeling provides a pertinent role of guiding data analytics (i.e., on what measurements to
use and what quantities to estimate). Data determines significantly what knowledge can be
learned about resilience.
1.2.5.1 Data on Failure and Recovery
The power industry has been collecting data on failures, restoration and impacts to cus-
tomers [28]. The objectives of this collection have been for outage management, customer
communication and reporting [31]. Data analysis is yet to become a focus.
As a typical example of granular data, an item on a failure includes “occurrence- and




Figure 1.5: Geo-locations and occurrences of failures, and the storm track during Super
Storm Sandy.
number of customers affected” [11, 16, 24]. Here activated protective devices signify the
actual failed components, and themselves interrupt electricity service to customers [27,43].
One minute is the finest temporal resolution of the available data for failure occurrence
and restoration time. Resulting from customer reports on service interruptions, such a time
scale is consistent with that of weather-induced failures from dynamic evolution of severe
storms [11, 16, 27, 30]. Failures can further cause outages in a distribution system, where
certain components lose power but are not damaged [18]. Outages occur in seconds or
less [18, 32]. Therefore, the temporal scale of failure data should ideally be less than a
second. Such a fine temporal scale is not yet achieved in current data collection. Advanced
technologies are required to attain such granularity beyond customer reports. The current
resolution on restoration time is also a minute, where failure durations vary from minutes
to hours and days.
Geo-locations of failures and outages are provided in exact coordinates of (latitude,
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longitude) [11]. The location information is usually available on activated protective de-
vices rather than actual failed components [11, 18, 42]. Data on locations of failed power
components are more informative for studying relationships between failures and weather
variables [42, 45]. Although not usually available for research, the information on failed
devices is known in principle after restoration. Detecting power failures and identifying
their locations in real-time have been of research interest, especially with deployment of
smart meters, (micro) phasor measurement units (PMUs) for distribution systems, field
sensors, and control units [13,79–82]. Overall, accurate geo-locations together with down-
time of both failed components and activated protective devices are desirable for studying
spatiotemporal variability of severe weather impacts (Fig. 1.5).
Accuracy of the data is another pertinent issue. Existing collection methods can fail
to generate high resolution data, especially in severely impacted service regions [83]. For
example, a large number customer calls in a short time duration hinders failure isolation
[83]. Repair crews are typically busy fire-fighting to restore services to customers; data
collection on recovery time is thus not a priority [83]. Therefore, automated approaches
are pertinent for accurate data collection.
Impacts on customers provide another important source of information on resilience.
Available data on the impact is currently measured as the number of customers affected by
each failure [11,24,27]. Total customer down-time can then be obtained, reflecting impacts
from both failures and recoveries [11].
1.2.5.2 Data on Weather Variables
Data on weather variables offer pertinent information on external causes of failures and
delays on recovery. Commonly-used data on severe storms have been collected on wind
intensity and gust, precipitation, moisture, and temperature [24, 27]. Such data are usually
provided by additional sources outside DSO service regions. While an extensive survey
of weather data is beyond the scope of this work, well-known example data on wind and
precipitation are from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) [11,
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27,43,84]. The spatiotemporal granularity of the data varies. For example, the wind speed
is measured in minutes and at the centroid of each zip code [47]. The resolution for gust
wind-speed is estimated at three-second intervals and each 3.66 km × 2.44km grid cell [43].
Weather data with a coarse spatiotemporal resolution can be insufficient for terrains with
dynamically varying weather conditions. Recent data collection and forecasting techniques
improve spatial resolution by incorporating community weather-stations [84, 85].
Several DSOs have installed densely distributed weather stations in their service re-
gions, where existing regional weather service is insufficient for dynamic local-conditions.
This allows data to be collected on both weather and power failures at comparable spa-
tiotemporal scales [36]. For instance, National Grid has deployed weather stations, each of
which covers five square miles in a service area [36]. Central Hudson Electric and Gas has
weather stations needed for the varying terrain conditions in the service region [86]. San
Diego Gas and Electric has sensors and mini weather stations for predicting wildfires and
the resulting power failures [87]. Furthermore, a commercial product (Deep Thunder) by
IBM offers localized weather prediction at a spatial scale of city blocks [85].
Storm surge and flooding result in damages on power components [83]. However, data
on surge and flooding are available at a fewer sources [88]. Synthetic data have been
generated from simulation on storm surge and flooding as well as high winds when detailed
data are difficult to obtain [89, 90]. A challenge is for simulated data to be sufficiently
accurate relating to failures in the infrastructure.
Other exogenous variables include land cover, where residential, forest, commercial,
industrial, and transportation land use seem to be related to impacts of service interruptions
on customers [27, 30, 42]. For example, tree density is an exogenous variable used in prior
work that results in down-wire and other initiating failures from high winds [27, 30, 42].
1.2.5.3 Analytics
As modeling and available measurements lay foundations for data analytics, a pertinent
question is what knowledge can be learned from data.
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DSOs have long been collecting data on failures and recoveries [28]. A major use of
data is on outage management [28,83]. For example, customer reports on service interrup-
tion are combined with outage management systems to localize failures. Such information
is then used for guiding repair crews. Outage maps are generated for customers on evolu-
tion of failures and restoration [91]. Aggregated information on failure and recovery is used
for reporting impacts and performance on service restoration [92]. Data analytics have not
been a significant part of standard outage management in practice.
Failure prediction has been studied by the prior works [27, 36, 37] and [38]. One of the
first works, although mainly focused on reliability rather than resilience, applies machine
learning to predict equipment failures in the New York City power grid [38]. An objective is
to enable proactive maintenance for reducing severe impacts of power failures resulting in
events such as explosions or fires. Data on failures and assets are collected from manholes
in multiple years. Reactive point processes are used to learn model parameters from the
data [93]. Although the power grid in New York City is complex, the data analytics showed
promise for failure prediction [38, 93].
Several other prior works pioneered failure prediction using weather data and regression
models (see Section 1.2.2). The premise is that if the likelihood of failures can be obtained
given weather variables, failures can be predicted through weather forecasts [27, 36, 37].
Data on failures and weather from one service region are used for parameter estimation
and model validation [24, 30, 36, 37, 39, 40, 43, 45, 47].
A challenge is that detailed data is often unavailable on failures due to security issues
[45]. As such, the early works have had to use aggregated failure data [24, 30, 39, 40, 43].
Temporal aggregation results in the number of failures, ranging from one day to an entire
period of a hurricane [30, 39, 94]. Spatial aggregation of failure locations ranges from a
small grid cell of 0.42 km2 to an area specified by a geocode or zip-code [30, 39, 45, 67].
On other occasions failure and weather data have different granularity [30]. Failure
data are then aggregated to match the coarser geographic resolution of measurements on
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weather and other exogenous variables [30]. Overall, aggregated information over time
and locations cannot specify exactly when and where individual failures occur and recover.
Thus data on weather and failures, when either are aggregated, can affect the accuracy of a
learned model and consequently prediction.
With densely-installed weather stations in a service territory, several recent works have
been able to use detailed data on both weather and power failures, resulting in a few failure
prediction systems for DSOs [36, 85, 87].
In this thesis, as data plays an important role, we took extremely care of the data that
used in the analytics. The temporal accuracy and spatial resolution of the data was the most
refined up to date and we kept high granularity of the data.
1.2.5.4 Regression Study at National Scale
As a severe weather event often spans multiple service regions, a question is how to extend
data analysis from one service territory to a regional or national scale. Granular data on
power failure and recovery are owned privately by individual DSOs. A recent work ex-
plores a novel option of publicly available data [95]. Such data result from DSO annual
report on the IEEE standard reliability indices: System Average Interruption Frequency
Index (SAIFI) and System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) [64]. SAIFI and
SAIDI are the average number of power failures and downtime durations per customer
per year. Thus such data are aggregated with a spatial resolution of a service region and
temporal scale of a year [92].
The data are collected at the national scale across the US over the past 13 years [95].
Data on exogenous variables are also obtained on weather, DSO expenses on reliability,
and the density of power lines. The data from all sources are used to learn parameters of
regression models [95]. The failure and duration indices are found to correlate with weather
variables, especially when major weather events occurred.
While this approach explores new large-scale data sources, stationarity of the variables
may be required so that regression using aggregated data can equivalent to using detailed
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measurements. Intuitively, the approach is expected to perform well for daily operations
when the stationarity is natural for failures and restorations. When including a severe
weather event, detailed data are needed at sufficiently fine spatiotemporal scales.
1.3 Our Approaches and Thesis Outline
The major goal of this research is to investigate what is the nature of large-scale power
failures and recoveries at distribution systems impacted by severe weather events. The pro-
posed dynamic models of non-stationary spatiotemporal random process provides a fun-
damental characterization from bottom-up. Modeling provides basis for the analytics of
the large-scale real data, which further reveals the vulnerability of the power infrastruc-
ture and cost to services and customers. Modeling and data analytics together enable the
quantification of the resilience of the power distribution systems.
As the first step, we propose a spatiotemporal models of random processes. In Chapter
2, we analyze the non-stationarity and dynamics of the large-scale power failures occur at
power distribution systems that are due to external disruptions. We address the issues of
how to model such non-stationary behaviors in three aspects. First, a novel formulation
is derived for an entire life cycle of large-scale failure and recovery of power distribution.
Second, spatiotemporal models of failure and recovery of power distribution are developed
as geo-location based multivariate non-stationary GI(t)/G(t)/∞ queues. Third, the non-
stationary spatial-temporal models identify a small number of parameters to be learned.
Learning is applied to two real-life examples of large-scale disruptions. One is from Hurri-
cane Ike, where data from an operational network is exact on failures and recoveries. The
other is from Hurricane Sandy, where aggregated data is used for inferring failure and re-
covery processes at one of the impacted areas. Model parameters are learned using real
data. Data analytics reveals, that failure rates behave similarly at the two different provider
networks for two different hurricanes but differently at the geographical regions, and that
both rapid- and slow-recovery are present for Hurricane Ike but only slow recovery is shown
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for a regional distribution network from Hurricane Sandy.
In addition to aggregating failures to a spatial region, we include a new term of dynamic
topology of the distribution systems in the modeling. In Chapter 3, we address the issues
of topological impact of distribution system structures on power failures and recoveries.
A focus is on incorporating pertinent characteristics of topological network structures into
spatial temporal modeling. Such characteristics are new notations as dynamic failure- and
recovery-neighborhoods. The neighborhoods quantify correlated failures and recoveries
due to topology and types of components in power distribution. The resulting model is
a multi-scale non-stationary spatial temporal random process. Using the model and large-
scale real data from Hurricane Ike, unique characteristics are identified: The failures follow
the 80/20 rule where 74.3% of the total failures result from 20.7% of failure neighborhoods
with up to 72 components “failed” together. Thus the hurricane caused a large number of
correlated failures. Unlike the failures, the recoveries follow 60/90 rule: 59.3% of recov-
eries resulted from 92.7% of all neighborhoods where either one component alone or two
together recovered. Thus about 60% recoveries were uncorrelated and required individual
restorations.
Next, we extend the dependent spatiotemporal random processes to further include the
utility services and customers in Chapter 4. We also apply the models to study the impact of
power infrastructure and the cost on customers. We analyse data from four major service
regions representing Upstate New York during Super Storm Sandy and daily operations.
Using non-stationary spatiotemporal random processes that relate infrastructural failures
to recoveries and cost, our data analysis shows that local power failures have a dispropor-
tionally large non-local impact on people (i.e., the top 20% of failures interrupted 84% of
services to customers). A large number (89%) of small failures, represented by the bottom
34% of customers and commonplace devices, resulted in 56% of the total cost of 28 mil-
lion customer interruption hours. Our study shows that extreme weather does not cause but
rather exacerbates existing vulnerabilities, which are obscured in daily operations.
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Finally, we define and formulate a new dynamic resilience metric and use real data to
quantify the vulnerability (non-resilience) of real distribution systems under super storms
such as hurricanes. In Chapter 5, we develop a resilience metric from bottom-up that in-
corporates such pertinent characteristics as non-stationary failure-recovery processes and
impacts to customers. The metric builds from our prior work that derives a problem for-
mulation and a spatiotemporal model. The modeling starts from failures and recoveries
at individual components. Topological dependence of disruptions and recoveries in power
distribution is characterized through the dynamic topology. Dependent failures and re-
coveries are thus characterized by non-stationary spatiotemporal random processes. We
further include the impacts on customers in the model. The resulting model is a coupled
non-stationary random process on costs, allowing us to measure not only the resilience of




PROCESSES OF POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS
Large-scale power failures occur at power distribution systems that are due to external
disruptions such as hurricanes and severe storms exhibit spatiotemporal non-stationarity
and dynamics. In this chapter, we address the issues of how to model such non-stationary
behaviors in three aspects. First, a novel formulation is derived for an entire life cycle of
large-scale failure and recovery of power distribution. Second, spatiotemporal models of
failure and recovery of power distribution are developed as geo-location based multivariate
non-stationary GI(t)/G(t)/∞ queues. Third, the non-stationary spatial-temporal models
identify a small number of parameters to be learned. Learning is applied to two real-
life examples of large-scale disruptions. One is from Hurricane Ike, where data from an
operational network is exact on failures and recoveries. The other is from Hurricane Sandy,
where aggregated data is used for inferring failure and recovery processes at one of the
impacted areas. Model parameters are learned using real data. Data analytics reveals two
findings. First, failure rates behave similarly at the two different provider networks for two
different hurricanes but differently at the geographical regions. Second, both rapid- and
slow-recovery are present for Hurricane Ike but only slow recovery is shown for a regional
distribution network from Hurricane Sandy.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.1 provides background knowl-
edge and an example of large-scale failures at a power distribution network. Section 2.2
and 2.3 develops a problem formulation of spatial-temporal non-stationary random pro-
cesses. Section 2.4 describes the real data from Hurricane Ike and learns a geo-temporal
model. Section 2.5 studies non-stationary failure and recovery using parts of real data from
Hurricane Sandy. Section 2.6 discusses our findings. Section 2.7 concludes the chapter.
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Figure 2.1: A Section in A Distribution Network.
2.1 Background and Example
In this section, we provide examples on the temporal scale, and non-stationarity of failure
and recovery.
2.1.1 Time Scale of Failure and Recovery
We first discuss the time scale for modeling weather induced failures and recoveries. A
power distribution network consists of components such as substations, feeders, transform-
ers, power circuits, transmission lines, and meters. An example power distribution system
is illustrated in Figure 2.1, with a commonly used radial topology. Three types of compo-
nents are shown for illustration: A primary substation, three secondary power sources, and
loads. Links correspond to power lines. Assume that either a component or a link can fail
during a hurricane. Assume that the substation is used as a primary source during normal
operation. The secondary sources, that can be distributed renewable sources, are used for
back-up when the primary source fails [96]. Then the following scenarios can occur for
failure and recovery:
(a) If all the sources fail due to an external disruption, there is no electricity supply to
any loads. Hence, the loads experience dependent failures that can occur instantaneously.
23
The scenario of dependent failures also applies to other components upstream in a radial
topology that cause loss of electricity at nodes downstream. Dependent failures are often
experienced by loads in sub-seconds.
(b) If a link that connects a load to the network fails due to an external disruption,
there is no electricity supply to the load. Such link failures can occur independently due
to fallen trees or power lines. Thus loads experience independent loss of electricity. As
such independent failures are caused by exogenous weather, they are assumed to occur at a
time scale of a minute or beyond. Such a time scale can be estimated through how rapidly
a hurricane force wind passes a city. Consider a small city of 1, 600 acres as an example.
Based on the IEEE standard (IEEE/ASTM SI 10-1997) [97], an approximated “diameter”
of the city is about 1.6 miles. Consider the speed of the force wind at 60 miles per hour.
It takes about 1.6 minutes for the wind to pass the city. This provides a basis of using a
minute as a time scale of weather-induced failures.
(c) Recovery depends on the types of failures and recovery schemes. Certain failures
can be repaired through self-recovery [32]. For example, if the primary substation fails,
the electricity supply to all loads can be recovered when the three secondary sources are in
operation. In general, self-recovery and automated reconfiguration built in power distribu-
tion usually operate at a time scale of sub-seconds or seconds [32]. However, failures due
to external disruptions, e.g., falling trees and power lines, often require manual repair by
field crews. Recovery time depends on not only restoration schemes but also environmental
constraints, and is thus considered as random in this work. Such manual recovery time is
in either minutes or hours or days from failures.
In summary, failures and self-recoveries at a small time-scale of seconds or sub-seconds
depend on detailed network structure and self-recovery schemes. Failure and recovery at a
larger time scale of a minute and beyond are often due to external disruptions that evolve
dynamically and randomly.
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2.1.2 Example of Non-Stationary Failure and Recovery
To gain intuition on an entire life cycle of failure and recovery of a distribution network,
we consider a real-life example of large-scale power failures occurred during Hurricane
Ike in 2008. Figure 2.2 shows a histogram on failure occurrence time and duration at an
operational distribution network before, during and after the hurricane. Each bin has length
(failure occurrence time) of 1 hour and width (duration) of 4 hours. The height of each bin
represents the number of failures that occur at time t and last for duration d. Figure 2.3
shows geographical distributions of failure occurrences at two different time epochs, where
failure occurrence is evidently non-stationary across geographical regions. Hence,
(a) Failure occurrence is non-stationary, i.e., random and time-varying;
(b) Recovery time is non-stationary, i.e., obeys different probability distributions for
failures occurred at different time;
(c) Failure occurrence and recovery time are also non-stationary spatially, i.e., exhibit
different distributions for different geo-locations.
Hence, samples on failure occurrence time and duration are not identically distributed
but exhibit geo-temporal non-stationarity.
2.1.3 Non-Stationary Learning
Non-stationary random processes have been studied in the context of drifting concepts
(see [72–74] and references therein). Samples for learning are dynamically drawn from
a non-stationary environment. An issue arises on the sample size, i.e., whether data is
sufficient for characterizing underlying drifts of distributions.
The problem of learning non-stationary processes in this work exhibits unique chal-
lenges in terms of sample size. For simplicity, batch data is assumed to be collected for
learning an entire non-stationary life cycle of failure and recovery processes off-line. A
challenge here is that there is only one snapshot of a distribution network in space and
time from one external disruption. The number of data sets is often small, i.e., from a few
severe storms. Therefore, combining model-based and data-driven approaches becomes
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Figure 2.2: Empirical temporal distribution of failure durations in 3D.
important, where data can be used to learn a small number of model-parameters from one
external disruption at a time [76]. In addition, combining model-based and data-driven
approaches for learning is required by the problem: Learned model parameters need to
exhibit physical meaning for generic network behaviors upon external disruptions.
2.2 Stochastic Model
We now formulate large-scale failure and recovery based on non-stationary random pro-
cesses. We begin with the detailed information on nodal statuses in a distribution system.
We then aggregate the spatial variables of nodes to obtain temporal evolution of failure and
recovery across geo-graphical areas.
2.2.1 Failure and Recovery Probability
A geo-temporal random process provides a theoretical basis for modeling large-scale fail-
ures. The temporal variable is time t that is assumed to be continuous at the scale of a
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Figure 2.3: Geo-locations of failures occurred in different time durations. Red marker:
Failures occurred from 7 p.m to 8 p.m. Sep. 12. Yellow marker: Failures occurred from 5
a.m. to 6 a.m. Sep. 13. Graphical tool: Google Earth.
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minute. The spatial variable can be either geo- or network-location of a node. For simplic-
ity, this work considers geo-location as a spatial variable to focus on location-based failures
induced by severe weather. Nodes can be components in a distribution system such as sub-
stations, feeders, hubs, transformers, transmission lines, and distributed energy sources. A
shorthand notation i is used to specify the index of node i located at zi. i ∈ S = {1, 2, ..., n}
for a power distribution network with n nodes. An underlying network topology is assumed
to be radial so that cascading failures occurred in mesh networks are not considered.
Let Xi(zi, t) be the status of the i-th node at time t > 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We assume for
simplicity that nodes only exhibit two states: Xi(zi, t) = 1 if the i-th node is in a failure
mode, i.e., without power supply. Xi(zi, t) = 0 if the node is in normal operation. Failures
caused by external disruptions exhibit randomness. Whether and when a node fails is ran-
dom. Whether and when a failed node recovers is also random. Hence, random processes
can be used to characterize failure and recovery for all nodes in a network.
Given time t > 0, P{Xi(zi, t + τ) = 1} characterizes the probability that node i is failed in
the near future t + τ, where τ > 0 is a small time increment. Assume a node changes state,
i.e., from failure to normal and vice versa. Then for the ith node, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the probability
that node i stays in failure mode in [t, t + τ] is,
P{Xi(zi, t + τ) = 1} − P{Xi(zi, t) = 1}
=P{Xi(zi, t + τ) = 1, Xi(zi, t) = 0}
− P{Xi(zi, t + τ) = 0, Xi(zi, t) = 1}.
(2.1)
Equation 2.1 assumes Markov temporal dependence, and can be applied to n nodes in
a distribution network. The n equations together form a geo-temporal model of a network.
Note that statistically dependent failures at the small time scale less than a minute are not
considered here, as such failures are often caused by an internal network structure rather
than exogenous weather. Spatial dependence is embedded in the model but will be studied
explicitly in subsequent work.
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Figure 2.4: Histogram of failure occurrence time and the failure rate λ f (t) during Hurricane
Ike.
2.2.2 Aggregated Geo-Temporal Process
When large-scale failures are caused by one external disruption, information available is
from one “snapshot” of temporal spatial network statuses, and thus insufficient for specify-
ing a complete temporal-spatial model at the node level. Hence, nodes are aggregated over
a geographical region (Z), resulting in∑
i;zi∈Z
P{Xi(zi, t + τ) = 1} −
∑
i;zi∈Z








P{Xi(zi, t + τ) = 0, Xi(zi, t) = 1}.
(2.2)
Here P{Xi(zi, t) = 1} = E{I[Xi(zi, t) = 1]}, where I() is an indicator function. I(A) = 1 if
event A occurs, and I(A) = 0 otherwise. We can define a geo-temporal process as follows.
Definition: {N(t,Z) ∈ N, t > 0} is a geo-temporal process where the spatial variables
(i’s) are aggregated for all nodes zi in a predefined region Z. N(t,Z) is the number of nodes




I[Xi(zi, t) = 1]. (2.3)
29








P{Xi(zi, t) = 1},
(2.4)
where ∆N(t,Z) = N(t + τ,Z) − N(t,Z) is an increment of the number of failed nodes in
a certain region. ∆N(t,Z) is the result of either newly-failed or newly-recovered nodes.
Hence, we define a failure process and a recovery process respectively.
Definition: Failure process {N f (t,Z) ∈ N, t ≥ 0} is the number of failures occurred up
to time t. Recovery process {Nr(t,Z) ∈ N, t ≥ 0} is the number of recoveries occurred up to
time t.
Assume τ > 0 is sufficiently small so that failure or recovery occurs at most once to a
node during (t, t + τ). The increments on a failure process and a recovery process satisfy
respectively,
E{∆N f (t,Z)} =
∑
i;zi∈Z




P{Xi(zi, t + τ) = 0, Xi(zi, t) = 1},
(2.5)
where ∆N f (t,Z) = N f (t +τ,Z)}−N f (t,Z). Similarly, for a sufficiently small τ > 0, it can be
assumed that at most one recovery occurs during (t, t+τ). Hence, Equation 2.2 is simplified
as,
E{∆N(t,Z)} = E{∆N f (t,Z)} − E{∆Nr(t,Z)}. (2.6)
Furthermore, we assume at time t0 = 0, N(t,Z) = 0, N f (t,Z) = 0, and Nr(t,Z) = 0.
Aggregating increments in Equation 2.6 from 0 to t, we have,
E{N(t,Z)} = E{N f (t,Z)} − E{Nr(t,Z)}. (2.7)
Hence, the expected number of nodes in the failure state equals to the difference be-
tween the expected failures and the expected recoveries. We now group a distribution net-
work of n nodes into m geographical regions Z j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, based on their geo-locations.
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A city, e.g., a subdivision, is an example of a geo-graphical region widely-used by utilities.
Then the failure-recovery process for the entire distribution network N(t) is defined as,
N(t) = [N(t,Z1),N(t,Z2), ...,N(t,Zm)]T, (2.8)
where N(t,Z j) characterizes how local power distribution in region Z j responds to an ex-
ternal disruption.
2.3 Non-Stationary Failure and Recovery
In this section, we derive non-stationary characteristics on failure and recovery. Our deriva-
tion reveals pertinent quantities that completely model the behaviors of large-scale power
failures and recoveries in expected values. This is pertinent to learning a small number of
parameters in Section 2.4.
2.3.1 Failure Process
A failure process can be characterized to the first moment by failure rate functions. Let
λ f (t) = [λ f (t,Z1), λ f (t,Z2), ..., λ f (t,Zm)]T be a vector that consists of the rate function of
a failure process, where λ f (t,Z j) is the expected number of new failures per unit time at
epoch t and region Z j, j = 1, 2, ...,m,




E{N f (t + τ,Z j) − N f (t,Z j)}. (2.9)
The larger λ f (t,Z j) is, the faster failures occur in Z j at time t. λ f (t,Z j) is referred to as
the rate function of the failure process N f (t,Z j). Hence, failure rate quantifies the intensity
of failure occurrence. An non-stationary failure process has a time-varying intensity func-
tion λ f (t,Z j) across geo-locations. Assuming a failure process begins at t = 0, we have
E{N f (t)} = [E{N f (t,Z1)}, ..., E{N f (t,Zm)}]T, where
E{N f (t,Z j)} =
∫ t
0
λ f (v,Z j)dv, (2.10)
for 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
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2.3.2 Recovery Process
A recovery process can be characterized by recovery rate function λr(t), where λr(t) =
[λr(t,Z1), λr(t,Z2), ..., λr(t,Zm)]T. λr(t,Z j) is the expected number of new recoveries per
unit time at epoch t and region Z j,




E{Nr(t + τ,Z j) − Nr(t,Z j)}. (2.11)
An non-stationary recovery process N f (t,Z j) has a time-varying rate function. Assuming





The recovery rate characterizes how rapidly recovery occurs, which is measured by
failure duration D. For an non-stationary recovery process, a failure duration depends
on when and where a failure occurs as illustrated in Figure 2.2. Such non-stationarity of
recovery is characterized by g(d|t,Z j) which is a conditional probability density function of
failure duration D = d given failure time T = t at region Z j. For a given threshold d0 > 0,
the conditional probability that a duration is bounded by d0 for failures occurred at time t is




When d0 is sufficiently small, this probability characterizes rapid recovery that occurs
shortly after failures. For a given d0, the larger P{D < d0|t,Z j} is, the more rapid recovery
dominates a recovery process. Given desired value of probability P{D < d0|t,Z j}, the
smaller d0 is, the more dominating the rapid recovery is.
Rapid recovery is referred to as infant recovery. This terminology is borrowed from
infant mortality in survivability analysis [98]. Infant recovery is a desirable characteristic
of the smart grid. In contrast, slow recovery is referred to as aging recovery in analogous
to aging mortality [99]. Infant and aging recovery can be formally defined as follows.
Definition: Let d0 > 0 be a threshold value. If a node remains in failure for a duration
less than d0; a recovery is an infant recovery. Otherwise, the recovery is aging recovery.
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Infant recovery is characterized by P{D < d0|t,Z j}. Aging recovery is characterized by
P{D > d0|t,Z j}.
2.3.3 Joint Failure-Recovery Process
A joint failure-recovery process characterizes an entire life cycle of a failure-recovery pro-
cess (FRP), and represents the total number of nodes N(t,Z) in failure state at time t in





[λ f (v,Z j) − λr(v,Z j)]dv. (2.14)
Failure-and-recovery process can be viewed as a birth-death process. However, com-
monly used birth-death processes have a stationary distribution of failure duration and as-
sume independence between failure occurrence t and failure duration d [100]. Here, these
two assumptions do not hold. This implies that failures occurred at different time can last
different duration. For example, under strong and sustained hurricane wind, failures that
do not happen in day-to-day operation can occur due to falling debris and power lines. We
shall further elaborate this through the real-life examples in Sections 2.4 and 2.5.
A recovery process is related to a failure process through a probability density function
of failure durations.
Theorem Let {N f (t,Z j)} be an independent increment (failure) process with a rate func-
tion λ f (t,Z j), 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Let D(t) be the duration of a failur occurred at time t and region
Z j. D(t) has a conditional probability density function g(d|t,Z j), where d ≥ 0, t ≥ 0. Then




g(t − s|s,Z j)λ f (s,Z j)ds, (2.15)
where 1 ≤ j ≤ m, d = t−s with s and t being the failure time and recovery time respectively.
The theorem is a corollary of the Transient Little’s Theorem [59]. Intuitively, g(t −
s|s,Z j)ds can be viewed as the probability that a failure occurred at time s and region Z j
lasts t − s duration. g(t − s|s,Z j)dsλ f (s,Z j) is the average number of failures per unit time
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recover after t−s duration, i.e., the recovery rate by definition. Aggregating over all failures
occurred prior to time t results in Equation 2.15.
2.3.4 What to Learn
What to learn now becomes apparent. Failure rate functions and probability density func-
tions of recovery time completely specify our model to the first moment, i.e.,
• λ f (t, |Z j), for 1 ≤ j ≤ m,
• g(t − s|s,Z j), for 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
In general, the forms and the parameters of these two functions are unknown, and need
to be learned from real data. The learned functions and the parameters can then be used to
estimate the empirical processes. The empirical processes are the sample means N̂(t,Z j),
N̂ f (t,Z j), and N̂r(t,Z j) that estimate the true expectations E{N(t,Z j)}, E{N f (t,Z j)}, and
E{Nr(t,Z j)}, respectively.
2.4 Hurricane Ike
In this section, we apply learning to a real-life example of large-scale utility-service dis-
ruptions caused by a hurricane.
2.4.1 Data From Hurricane Ike
Hurricane Ike was one of the strongest hurricanes occurred in 2008. Ike caused large scale
power failures, resulting in more than 2 million customers without electricity, and marked
as the second costliest Atlantic hurricane of all time [101] [102].
Reported by National Hurricane Center [103], the storm started to cause power failures
across the onshore areas in Louisiana and Texas on September 12, 2008 prior to the landfall.
Ike then made a landfall at Galveston, Texas on 2:10 a.m. (CDT), September 13, 2008,
causing strong winds, flooding, and heavy rains across Texas. The hurricane weakened to
a tropical storm at 1:00 p.m. September 13 and passed Texas by 2:00 a.m. September 14.
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A major utility provider collected data on power failures from more than ten cities. The
failures include failed circuits, fallen poles and power lines, and non-operational substa-
tions. The raw data set has of 5152 samples. Each sample consists of the failure occurrence
time (ti) and duration (di) of a component (i) in a distribution network from September 12
through 14, 2008. The accuracy for time t is a minute.
2.4.2 Data Processing
The data set contains bursts of failures that occurred within a minute. As a minute is
the smallest time scale for each sample, the bursts are considered as dependent failures.
Dependent failures are grouped as one failed entity (i), with a unique failure occurrence
time ti and duration di. After such preprocessing, the resulting data set has 465 failed
entities. Two outliers with negative failure duration are further removed. The remaining
463 failed entities from 7 am September 12 to 4 am September 14 are referred to as nodes.
D = {ti, di}463i=1 is the data set we use for learning.
Spatial variables {Zi}’s can be either chosen a priori or through learning from data. In
this work, we choose {Zi}’s to be small cities to include a natural living environment of
customers and this method is widely-used by utility providers. There are 13 cities in the
data set as illustrated in Figure 2.7.
2.4.3 Temporal Failure Process
We first study the temporal non-stationarity of the failure-and-recovery process. Spatial
variables are aggregated across the entire network. This is equivalent to reducing multiple
geo-graphical areas to one entire impact-region from the hurricane. Then the geo-temporal
failure-recovery process reduces to a temporal process. For notational simplicity, spatial
variables are omitted for temporal processes.
The empirical rate function is estimated using a simple algorithm based on moving
average [104]: λ̂ f (t) =
N̂ f (t+τ)−N̂ f (t−τ)
2τ , where τ is chosen to be 5 hours. The resulting rate
function is overlaid with the samples on the number of failures N̂ f (t) in Figure 2.4, where
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Figure 2.5: Empirical distribution of failure duration for failures occurred during the land-
fall.
each bin is of duration 1 hour.
The learned failure rate function shows a time-varying rate of new failure occurrence:
(a) Prior to 7 p.m. September 12, the rate was low, i.e., fewer than 5 new failures oc-
curred per hour. Hence 5 per hour is considered as the failure rate in day-to-day operation.
(b) At 7 p.m. September 12, the rate increased sharply first to 25 new failures per
hour. In the next 6 hours, the rate reached the peak value of nearly 50 new occurrences per
hour. This is consistent to the weather report [103] that the strong wind about 145 mph and
flooding impacted the onshore areas prior to the landfall. The time of the peak coincides
with the landfall at 2:10 a.m 9/13 CDT.
(c) After staying at the high level for about 12 hours (from 7 p.m. September 12 to
7 a.m. September 13), the rate decreased rapidly back to a low level of less than 5 new
failures per hours.
2.4.4 Temporal Recovery Process
We now learn the empirical recovery process characterized by g(d|t), the conditional prob-
ability density function of failure duration given failure occurrence time t. As the spatial
aggregation removes the geo-location variables, g(d|t) is the conditional density function
of failure duration of an entire network.
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Figure 2.6: Comparison between the joint failure-recovery process N(t) from the data set
and the reconstructed process N̂(t) using learned parameters.
We use the 463 samples on the failure durations and occurrences in our data set. These
samples result in a joint empirical distribution ĝ(d, t) in Figure 2.2. The height of each bin
located at (t, d) represents the number of failures that occur at time t and last for duration
d. Figure 2.2 shows non-stationarity of failure durations. For example, a large number
(217) of failures occurred between 7 p.m. September 12 and 8 a.m. September 13 lasted
for more than a day. This indicates that many failures occurred during the surge of the
hurricane were difficult to recover. Hence, a non-stationary distribution for g(d|t) is an
appropriate assumption.
Given failure occurrence time t, we observe that the distribution of duration is a com-
bination of two components: Infant and aging recoveries. We thus select a mixture model




ρ j(t)g j(d|t), (2.16)
where l(t) is the number of mixtures at time t, ρ j(t) (1 ≤ j ≤ l) is a weighting factor for the
jth mixture function g j(d|t), and
∑
ρ j(t) = 1. Weighting factor ρ j(t) signifies the importance
of the jth component g j(d|t). For a non-stationary recovery process, these parameters vary
with failure time t.
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A mixture model is chosen since its parameters exhibit interpretable physical mean-
ing [41, 105, 106]. A parametric family of Weibull mixtures is particularly appealing as
the parameters correspond to infant and aging recovery directly. Weibull distributions have
been widely used in survival analysis [98,99] and reliability theory [100], but not in charac-
terizing recovery from large-scale external disruptions. Specifically, a Weibull distribution
is











where d > 0, k(t) and γ(t) are the shape and scale parameters respectively. Hence, jth
component in Equation 2.16 is g j(d|t) = w(d|t; γ j(t), k j(t)).
Shape and scale parameters, k(t) and γ(t), are pertinent for characterizing the type of
recovery. The smaller k(t) and γ(t) are, the faster the decay of g(d|t), the shorter the failure
duration and thus the faster the recovery. Hence, k(t) < 1 and moderate γ(t) (e.g., γ(t) ∼ 10h
or smaller) correspond to infant recovery. k(t) > 1 and large γ(t) (e.g., γ(t) ∼ 100h)
correspond to aging recovery.
For simplicity, we use a piecewise homogeneous function to approximate g(d|t). The
failure time t is divided into 5 intervals shown in Figure 2.2. Within interval ψi for 1 ≤ i ≤ 5,
g(d|t ∈ ψi) = gi(d) is assumed to be stationary that does not vary with failure time t. For
different intervals, g(d|t ∈ ψi)’s have different parameters for non-stationarity,
g(d|t ∈ ψi) =
li∑
j=1
ρi, jgi, j(d; γi, j, ki, j). (2.18)
The parameters of the Weibull mixtures within each interval are learned through maxi-
mum likelihood estimation [41] from the data. Failure durations obey different distributions
for failures occurred at different intervals, showing the non-stationarity. For example, the
first duration ψ1 (7 a.m. September 12 to 7 p.m. September 12) is when the network was not
yet impacted widely by Hurricane Ike. Three Weibull mixtures are learned from the data,
with the shape, the scale and weighting parameters as (1, 0.71, 0.486), (10.5, 14.4, 0.257)
and (10.7, 211.8, 0.257). The first two components result in dominating infant recovery,
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Figure 2.7: Geographical location of the 13 regions (cities).
where 74.3% of failures recovered within a day. In contrast, the third duration ψ3 (3 a.m.
September 13 to 3 p.m. September 13) is when the large-scale failures continued to occur
after the landfall. Two Weibull mixtures are learned from the data. The shape, the scale
and weighting parameters are (5.3, 11.0, 0.323) and (12.4, 112.2, 0.677), showing dominat-
ing aging recovery. As the result, only 32.2% of failures recovered within a day. The
second duration ψ2 (7 p.m. September 12 and 8 a.m. September 13) is around the hur-
ricane landfall, where about a half of the failures occurred experienced infant recovery
within a day (see Figure 2.5 for the three Weibull mixtures). For 5 durations overall, the
probability of infant recovery within a day changes over time, showing the non-stationary
of failure-recovery processes.
We then reconstruct the empirical temporal failure-recovery process N̂(t) with learned
























Figure 2.8: Empirical geo-temporal failure rate λ f during Hurricane Ike. Cities are se-
quenced with respect to the time when the failure rate reached the peak value in each
region.
N(t), the reconstructed and the actual sample paths of the failure-recovery process repec-
tively. The closeness between the two sample pathes shows that the piecewise stationary
g(d|t) approximates well the actual failure-and-recovery process.
2.4.5 Geo-Temporal Failure Process
We now incorporate geo-location variables to learn the geo-temporal non-stationarity. Fail-
ure process N f (t) is a geo-temporal process with multiple attributes N f (t,Z j) from m geo-
graphical regions, 1 ≤ j ≤ m. The empirical failure rate functions λ f (t,Z j) for 1 ≤ j ≤ m
are estimated using the same algorithm of moving average. The resulting rate vector λ f (t) is
multi-variate, consisting of m time-varying functions. Due to the small sample size, there
are 6 out of 13 cities shown in Figure 2.7, each of which has sufficient samples ranging
from 27 to 101. The hurricane track is plotted as a reference using data from NOAA [103].
Figure 2.8 shows the failure rates of the 6 cities. The multi-variate failure rates exhibit the
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following characteristics:
(a) Temporal non-stationarity: At a given geographical region Z j, λ f (t,Z j) is a time-
varying function similar to the bell-shaped curve obtained for the entire network. Consider
Z5 as an example. The failure rate was low (few than 5 failures) prior to 7 p.m. September
12. Then, the rate increased sharply and reached the maximum value of 25 new failures
per hour, at about 1 a.m. September 13. After that, the rate decreased rapidly to few than 5
failures.
(b) Spatial non-stationarity: At a given time t, λ f (t,Z j) is a spatially-varying function.
The peak values of failure rates vary from 1.5 to 27 per hour across the 9 cities. The
time when the rate reached the peak value varies between 8 p.m. September 12 to 7 a.m.
September 13, and is depicted as a dashed line at the bottom in Figure 2.8.
(c) Spatial temporal non-stationarity: The regions are then labeled with respect to the
order of failure rates that reached the maximum value in Figure 2.8. For example, the
failure rate at City Z4 reached the peak value first, followed by the failure rates at City
Z1 through City Z8. The figure shows the geo-temporal characteristic that failure rates
at different city reached their peak values approximately from the coast to inland. This
appears to be consistent to the movement of the hurricane track (Figure 2.7).
2.4.6 Geo-Temporal Recovery Process
To learn the geo-temporal non-stationary recovery, we extend the mixture model (Equation




ρi(t,Z j)gi(d|t,Z j). (2.19)
Again our learning focuses on the 6 cities with sufficient samples. Dependencies of
failure durations among cities are not studied in this work because of the small sample size.
We apply the piecewise homogeneous distribution function in Equation 2.18 to each
region Z j,
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Figure 2.9: Geographical distribution of infant (green) and aging (red) recoveries in the 6
cities: d0 = 24 hours. Graphical tool: Google Earth.
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g(d|t ∈ ψi, z ∈ Z j) =
li, j∑
ζ=1
ρζ,i, jgζ,i, j(d). (2.20)
Here, each component gζ,i, j(d) is a Weibull distribution w(d; γζ,i, j, kζ,i, j). Mixture g(d|t ∈
ψi, z ∈ Z j)’s and their coefficients vary with respect to not only failure occurrence time ψi
(temporal non-stationarity) but also geo-locations Z j’s (spatial non-stationarity).
Applying the maximum likelihood estimation [41], we obtain the estimated parameters
of Weibull distributions in the 6 cities. Note that due to the small sample size in some of
the regions, the parameters of distributions of failure duration have to be assumed, in our
implementation, not varying with failure occurrence time within a region. The probability
of infant recoveries is also computed accordingly. Three cities (1, 4, 6) show a similar
percentage of infant recovery from 66% to 68% whereas the remaining cities (3, 5, 8)
have infant recovery from 40% to 45%. Table 2.1 shows the learned model parameters
for two example cities. Figure 2.9 shows the geographical distribution of infant and aging
recoveries for the 6 cities.
The probability of infant recovery as well as model parameters vary across different
geographical regions, showing the spatial non-stationarity of the recovery process. Exam-
ining more details, adjacent cities (e.g., 1 and 3) that are close to the coast can exhibit
different percentages of infant recovery. Faraway cities (e.g., city 8 which is far in land and
city 5 which is close to the coast) can also exhibit a similar percentage of infant recovery.
Hence, recovery processes seem to be complex and require further study.
2.5 Hurricane Sandy
We now learn using real data from another real-life example of large-scale disruptions
caused by Hurricane Sandy. This provides an understanding how our model and learning
approach can be generalized to other hurricanes.
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Figure 2.10: Number of customers without power in two counties in New Jersey during
Hurricane Sandy: (a) County One; (b) County Two.
2.5.1 Data
Hurricane Sandy had a landfall at Northeastern United States on October 28, 2012. Hur-
ricane Sandy resulted more than 6 million customers without electricity for days. The
state with the most customers without power was New Jersey, where about 1.98 million
customers lost power supplies [21].
A utility company, reported the number of failures (outages) in more than 10 counties
in New Jersey from October 28, 2012 to November 22, 2012. The aggregated number of
reported outages is a sample in our data set. Each sample consists of a given geo-location
and time t at the scale of 15 minutes (the reporting interval). The geo-location variable Z j
corresponds to a county in New Jersey for 1 ≤ j ≤ 14. The data set consists of 2275 such
samples, i.e., {N(t,Z j)}14j=1 for time t from October 28 to November 22, 2012. Figure 2.11(a)
plots the data. Note that such aggregated data does not provide accurate occurrence time
nor duration of each power failure.
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Table 2.1: Estimated parameters of distributions of failure durations in 2 cities.
g(d|z ∈ Z1) 1 2 3 P{d < 24}
ρ1,ζ 0.3478 0.3188 0.3333
γ1,ζ 0.0045 12.1893 197.0316 66.63%
k1,ζ 0.2490 2.7891 3.7629
g(d|z ∈ Z3) 1 2 3 P{d < 24}
ρ3,ζ 0.3000 0.1500 0.5500
γ3,ζ 0.0650 12.2138 129.7408 45.37%
k3,ζ 0.2897 3.9992 2.8037
2.5.2 Empirical Failure Process
Learning now begins with the aggregated number of failures N(t,Z j) for 1 ≤ j ≤ 14, from
which failure- and recovery- rates are estimated accordingly. This is a reverse process to
learning from detailed failure data in Hurricane Ike.
To learn the failure rate, we recall that λ f (t) = ddt E[N f (t)] from Equation 2.10, and
λ f (t) − λr(t) = ddt E[N(t)] from Equation 2.14. This suggests that a lower bound λ̂ f l(t) on
the failure rate can be estimated from the aggregate number of failures at time t as
λ̂ f l(t,Z j) =
d
dt
N(t,Z j), if t = t∗, (2.21)
where t∗ is a time epoch when N(t∗,Z j) increases.
To determine how to obtain such an estimate, we examine characteristics of raw (time
series) data N(t,Z j) at the county level. Figure 2.10 shows two examples of the number of
aggregated failures N(t,Z j) at two different counties in New Jersey. N(t,Z j) shows sharp
increases and sharp decreases. A sharp increase occurs when the failure rate exceeds the
recovery rate whereas a sharp decrease happens when recovery rate exceeds the failure rate.
Hence, a change point in N(t,Z j) can be used to identify a lower bound for either a failure
rate or a recovery rate. In addition, a sharp increase/decrease indicates a salient rather than
noisy change point, where a lower bound can be obtained accurately.
We first obtain the positive increments from N(t,Z j) for each region Z j using Equation
2.21. We then aggregate the increments over the 14 regions to obtain a lower bound λ̂ f l(t)
for the failure rate of the utility network. N̂ f (t), the estimated lower bound on the number
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Figure 2.11: Failure process and recovery process from Hurricane Sandy: (a) N(t), (b)
λ̂ f l(t), (c) λ̂rl(t).
of failures up to time t, can then be obtained by integrating λ̂ f l(t), which is shown in Figure
2.11(b).
2.5.3 Empirical Recovery Process
To learn the empirical recovery rate, we apply Equation 2.21 except that t∗ corresponds
to the time epoch of a decrease in the number of failures. Figure 2.11(c) shows an esti-
mated lower bound λ̂rl(t) for recovery rate and the cumulative number of recoveries N̂r(t)
respectively.
Since the aggregated data from Hurricane Sandy does not contain detailed recovery time
for each failure, it is impossible to learn the time-varying distribution of failure duration
g(d|t). Nevertheless, the aggregated data can be used to estimate a stationary distribution
of recovery time, i.e., g(d). As the detailed information on failure duration is not available
from the data, we consider a simple distribution with one Weibull mixture g(d; γ, k). Ap-
plying discrete samples to Theorem 2.3.3, reconstructed recovery rate λ̃rl(t) can be related
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Figure 2.12: Weibull distribution for failure duration ĝ(d): (a) Estimated probability density
function; (b) Estimated and reconstructed recovery rates.
with g(d; γ, k) and λ̂ f l(t) as
λ̃rl(i · δ) ≈
i∑
j=0
g(i · δ − j · δ)λ̂ f l( j · δ)δ, (2.22)
where δ = 15 minuets is the step size, and iδ is the discrete time. Weibull parameters γ and
k are then estimated to minimize the estimation error ||λ̃rl(t) − λ̂rl(t)||2. Figure 2.12 shows
the estimated Weibull distribution, where the shape parameter k̂ = 1.3094 and the scale
parameter γ̂ = 54.1684. The resulting stationary distribution of failure durations is then
used to reconstruct a lower bound for the recovery rate. Figure 2.12 shows the estimated
λ̂rl(t) from the data set and the reconstructed λ̃rl(t). Reconstructed λ̃rl(t) thus provides a
profile on how the recovery varies with time.
2.6 Findings and Discussions
2.6.1 Findings
Learning from Hurricane Ike and Hurricane Sandy results in the following findings.
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2.6.1.1 Failure process
Failure rates are time-varying for both Hurricane Ike and Hurricane Sandy. The corre-
sponding failure processes are non-stationary in time and geo-graphical regions. However,
the failure rates exhibit different characteristics at the county level for Hurricane Ike and
Hurricane Sandy: The failure rates for Hurricane Ike appear to vary gradually. However,
the failure rates for Hurricane Sandy exhibit sharp changes, showing that failures occurred
in groups. When aggregated over geographical regions, failure rates for both hurricanes
exhibit similar characteristics, i.e., first rapidly increasing and then decreasing. More quan-
titative study is needed to further compare the failure processes for different hurricanes at
different spatial scales.
2.6.1.2 Recovery process
Learned recovery rates from Hurricane Ike and Hurricane Sandy are both time-varying.
For Hurricane Ike, the learned probability distributions of failure durations exhibit non-
stationarity in time and geo-locations, i.e., depend on when failures occur. Such distribu-
tions constitute both infant and aging recovery, as shown in Table 2.1 and Figure 2.9. The
degree of infant recovery, however, is different at different cities. Three out of the six cho-
sen cities recovered more rapidly then the rest. Failures with infant and aging recoveries
are also inter-leaving in geo-locations.
The recovery for the provider network from Hurricane Sandy shows a nearly steady rate
of 7000 recoveries per hour. In addition, the estimated Weibull distribution of the failure
duration exhibits stronger aging recovery than infant recovery. A lack of infant recovery for
this utility provider may indicate that power distribution networks suffered virulent disrup-
tions during Hurricane Sandy. The recovery can thus be difficult. Yet, detailed rather than
aggregated failure data is needed for accurately estimating distributions of failure durations.
Note that failures and recoveries can occur simultaneously within a 15 minute interval.
That is why the amount of increase in N(t,Z j) is a lower bound of the actual failure rate
λ f (t,Z j). When the number of failures increased rapidly, e.g., from October 28 to October
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31, recovery appeared to be minor. When the hurricane passed the area after October 31,
recovery dominated. This is shown by the lower bounds of the failure- and the recovery-rate
in Figure 2.11 and 2.12.
2.7 Conclusion
This work shows that non-stationary geo-temporal random processes naturally model large-
scale failure and recovery of power distribution induced by hurricanes. In particular, mul-
tivariate geo-location based GI(t)/G(t)/∞ queues provide such non-stationary failure- and
recovery processes. The non-stationary failure and recovery can be completely charac-
terized to the expected values by time-varying failure rate and probability distribution of
recovery time across geo-graphical regions.
Real data from two hurricanes have been used to learn failure and recovery processes.
Learning detailed failure data from Hurricane Ike reveals that the failure process across
different geographical regions follows a similar trend to that of the hurricane. However,
the failure- and recovery-processes exhibit different infant and aging recovery across geo-
graphical regions. Learning aggregated data from an impact area by Hurricane Sandy
shows that our model can infer failure- and recovery rates using aggregated data. The
failure rates have more significant discrete components for Hurricane Sandy than for Hur-
ricane Ike at geographical regions. The recovery process is dominated by aging recovery
for one utility network from Hurricane Sandy but consists of a significant component of in-
fant recovery for another utility from Hurricane Ike. This shows that GI(t)/G(t)/∞ model
is indeed needed for general failure- and recovery-processes in dynamic queues. Note that
these findings are for power distribution through open rather than underground networks.
These findings call for subsequent research on how distributed power distribution are
impacted by external disruptions. For example, power failures and recoveries are yet to
be studied at all impact areas for Hurricane Sandy. Spatial temporal dependencies among
power distribution networks at different geographical regions need to be studied explicitly.
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This requires combining detailed configurations of power distribution with the dynamic




DYNAMIC MODELING OF TOPOLOGICAL FAILURES AND
RECOVERIES OF POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS
In this chapter, we address the issues of topological impact of distribution system struc-
tures on power failures and recoveries. A focus is on incorporating pertinent characteristics
of topological network structures into spatial temporal modeling. Such characteristics are
new notations as dynamic failure- and recovery-neighborhoods. The neighborhoods quan-
tify correlated failures and recoveries due to topology and types of components in power
distribution. The resulting model is a multi-scale non-stationary spatial temporal random
process. Using the model and large-scale real data from Hurricane Ike, unique characteris-
tics are identified: The failures follow the 80/20 rule where 74.3% of the total failures result
from 20.7% of failure neighborhoods with up to 72 components “failed” together. Thus the
hurricane caused a large number of correlated failures. Unlike the failures, the recoveries
follow 60/90 rule: 59.3% of recoveries resulted from 92.7% of all neighborhoods where
either one component alone or two together recovered. Thus about 60% recoveries were
uncorrelated and required individual restorations.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 provides background knowl-
edge and an example of large-scale failures at a power distribution network. Section 3.2
formulate the problem and define dynamic power distribution topology, failure neighbor-
hood and recovery neighborhood. Section 3.3 develops a problem formulation of spatial-
temporal non-stationary random processes. Section 3.4 describes the real data from Hurri-
cane Ike and provide data analytics. Section 3.5 concludes the chapter.
3.1 Problem Description
Consider a node that represents a network component such as a substation, a transformer,
or a link as a feeder/power line. Severe weather can induce a failure directly to a node.
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For example, flooding can cause a non-functional substation and other equipment failures.
High winds can cause fallen poles or trees on power lines. Such weather-induced failures
often occur in minutes resulting from evolving severe-weather conditions [16].
A weather-induced failure, referred to as a failure in short, can result in secondary fail-
ures through a network structure. A network structure consists of a topology and different
types of components. For example, unbalanced currents from a failure can cause burned
line fuses as secondary failures. A failure upstream can also result in losses of electricity,
but no damage, at nodes downstream in a distribution tree. For example, either a non-
functional substation or a broken link cause a loss of power to downstream nodes. Those
nodes without electricity service are referred to as outages. Secondary failures and outages
occur at a smaller time scale of subminutes, as impacted by a network structure. Disrup-
tions include failures, secondary failures and outages.
Recovery occurs at two time-scales also. Self-recovery occurs in subminutes. Manual
repairs to damaged nodes occur at the time scale of minutes or longer [16]. When a failure-
or an outage-node regains electricity supply, downstream outage nodes regain the service
together. Hence, the multi-scale characteristics need to be quantified for disruption and
recovery respectively.
3.2 Models of Dynamic Topology
3.2.1 Failure and Neighborhoods
Let X(w)i (t) be the state of node i at time t, where i specifies both a network location and a
geo-location of the node, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. n is the total number of nodes in a network. t > 0
is continuous time. For simplicity, a node takes two states: X(w)i (t) = 1 if node i is in
disruption. X(w)i (t) = 0 if node i is in normal operation. w specifies three scenarios: w = f
for a failure induced by exogenous weather, w = f ′ for a secondary failure, and w = o for
an outage. An outage or a secondary failure is induced by a failure occurred at a network





































Figure 3.1: Example of neighborhoods.
Disruption A(w)i (t) is a state transition from normal to disruption {X
(w)
i (t−∆t) = 0, X
(w)
i (t) =
1}, which occurs in (t − ∆t, t] at node i, t > 0, w = { f , f ′, o}. ∆t > 0 is sufficiently small
so that there is only one failure, and one set of secondary failures or outages occurred in
(t − ∆t, t].
Failure neighborhood V ( f )i (t) is a new notion of dynamic topology, consisting of the
downstream nodes that are in normal operation preceding failure i at t−∆t. That is, for any
j ∈ V ( f )i (t), either outage A
(o)
j (t) or secondary failure A
( f ′)
j (t) occur with failure i. Hence, a
failure neighborhood characterizes correlated failures and outages.
3.2.2 Recovery and Neighborhoods
Recovery B(w)i (t) is the state transition from disruption to normal {X
(w)
j (t −∆t) = 1, X
(w)
j (t) =
0}, which occurs in (t − ∆t, t] at node i, t > 0, w = { f , f ′, o}. When w = f (or w = f ′),
failure i is repaired. When w = o, an upstream neighbor of node i is repaired.
Recovery neighborhood V (r)i (t) is another new notion of dynamic topology, consisting
of the downstream neighbors of node i that are in outage at (t−∆t, t) prior to the restoration.
∆t > 0 is sufficiently small so that there is one restoration and one set V (r)i (t) of recoveries
in (t − ∆t, t].
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3.2.3 Example
Figure 3.1 shows an example of disruption and recovery as well as the neighborhoods. First,
node 2 fails at time s, inducing secondary failure 3 and outage 4, i.e., V ( f )2 (s) = {3, 4}. Then
node i fails at t > s, inducing outages to nodes in failure neighborhood V ( f )i (t) = {1, 5, 6}.
Then node l fails at u > t, inducing outages to V ( f )l (u) = {7, 8}. Note that node 5 is
a downstream neighbor of both nodes i and l but only belongs to failure neighborhood
V ( f )i (t) of node i by definition. Hence failure neighborhoods are non-overlapping for failures
occurred at different locations and time.
Failure l is repaired at v > u, restoring failure l and outages in recovery neighborhood
V (r)l (v) = {5, 6, 7, 8}. Finally, failure i is repaired at w > v, restoring failure i and outages
in V (r)i (v) = {1, 2, 4}. Secondary failure 3 remains to be restored. This example illustrates
failure- and recovery-neighborhoods that are dynamically changing due to evolving failures
and reconfiguration in restoration.
Other patterns are possible for failure and recovery. For example, all outages {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}
can be reconfigured to connect to node k that is in normal operation, thus recover at time
v together. Failures i and l recover at later time y and z respectively, with empty recovery
neighborhoods V (r)i (y) = V
(r)
l (z) = φ. This scenario occurs when it is more time consuming
to repair a failure than restore power to outages.
3.3 Non-Stationary Spatial Temporal Processes
A dynamic network environment emerges from the above problem setting: External se-
vere weather causes network nodes to fail. The failed nodes induce secondary failures
and outages at their network neighbors. Failures/outages then recover together with their
neighbors. Such disruption and recovery are modeled as non-stationary spatial temporal
random processes, with dynamic neighborhoods at the component-level, and aggregations
of components in a service region.
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3.3.1 Disruption Process
Our modeling starts from the component-level. n nodes in a tree topology form a spatial
temporal process, consisting of a network of random state transitions as binary variables
{I[A(w)i (t)], I[B
(w)
i (t)]}, for t > 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,w = { f , f
′, o}. I(A) is an indicator function.
I(A) = 1 if the event A occurs; otherwise, I(A) = 0. Let ∆N(d)i (t) be the number of nodes
that are disrupted from electricity service in (t − ∆t, t]. For a sufficiently small ∆t > 0, it
is natural to assume that only one weather-induced failure occurs at node i, and one set of
related secondary failures and outages in (t − ∆t, t]. Then
∆N(d)i (t) = I[A
( f )





where v( f )i (t)I[A
( f )
i (t)] is a set of secondary failures and outages in neighborhood V
( f )
i (t).
v( f )i (t) = ||V
( f )
i (t)|| is the size of the failure neighborhood at node i and time t. v
( f )
i (t) charac-
terizes correlated disruptions. The larger v( f )i (t) is, the more correlated disruptions for the
node at time t.
Definition 1 Failure, outage and disruption rate. Failure rate of node i at time t is the
expected number of state transitions from normal to (weather-induced) failures per unit
time at node i, which is
λ
( f )








Here E{·} represents expectation. Outage rate that is induced by failure i at time t is the
expected number of state transitions from normal to outage per unit time at failure neigh-
borhood V ( f )i (t). For simplicity of notation, the outage rate here includes secondary failures
also, where
















λ(d)i (t) = λ
( f )




A disruption rate shows the impact of severe weather and a network structure. A failure
neighborhood shows explicitly impacts of topology and heterogeneous types of compo-
nents. When E{vi(t)I[A
( f )
i (t)]} ≈ E{vi(t)}E{I[A
( f )
i (t)]},
λ(o)i (t) ≈ λ
( f )
i (t)E{vi(t)}, (3.5)
λ(d)i (t) ≈ λ
( f )
i (t)(1 + E{vi(t)}). (3.6)
These simple expressions show that the outage rate is approximately the failure rate multi-
plied by the expected neighborhood size. The resulting disruption rate is thus proportional
to the failure rate and the total expected number of disruptions at node i and its neighbors.
3.3.2 Recovery Process
The number of nodes that are recovered in (t − ∆t, t] can be obtained similarly,
∆N(r)i (t) = I[B
( f )





where I[B( f )i (t)] is the state of recovery for failure i. v
(r)
i (t) = ||V
(r)
i (t)|| is the size of a recov-
ery neighborhood V (r)i (t). Recovery process is characterized by the recovery rate defined as
follows.
Definition 2 Recovery rate. The recovery rate for node i and its neighbors in V (r)i (t) at
time t is










The recovery rate and neighborhoods are dynamic, showing a changing topology in
restoration. The time-varying rates and neighborhoods show the non-stationarity of disruption-
and recovery-processes.
3.3.3 Joint Failure and Recovery Processes
Disruption and recovery are related through disruption durations. Let D(w)i (τ) be the dis-
ruption duration at node i and time τ, w = f , o. For node i, the total number of disrup-
tions that occurred at (τ − ∆τ, τ] and not restored at time t, 0 < τ < t, include failure
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I[A( f )i (τ)]I[D
( f )
i (τ) > t− τ], and failure- induced outages
∑






t − τ], i.e.,




i (τ) > t − τ] +
∑





j (τ) > t − τ]. (3.9)
The rate for the number of disruptions yet to be restored at node i and time t is obtained
as follows.
Theorem Assume a failure duration is independent of the failure- or the outage occur-










i (t − τ) + EV ( f )i (τ)
∑
j∈V ( f )i (τ)
h j, (3.10)
where g( f )i (t − τ) is the probability density function of failure duration for node i given the
failure occurrence time. h j is the conditional expectation, i.e., the rate of change for outages
not yet restored at time t given failure neighborhood V ( f )i (τ),






g(o)i (t − τ), (3.11)
g(o)j (t − τ) is the probability density function for outage j occurred at τ lasted for duration
of t − τ, given j ∈ V ( f )i (τ). EV ( f )i (τ){·} is the expectation over V
( f )
i (τ). Then the rate of change






i (t) − λ
(r)
i (t). (3.12)
The proofs draw approaches from [59]. Intuitively, the theorem shows that failure- and
recovery-processes jointly determine the speed of restoration in terms of the number of
disruptions yet to be restored at any given time.
3.3.4 Aggregation at Subnetwork-Level
Now let N(w)(t) be the number of disruptions in a subnetwork in a service region,
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Figure 3.2: Empirical rate functions of the network: (a) Failure rate, disruption rate, and





where w = { f , f ′, o}. i(τ) indicates the location of a disruption i at time τ. dτ is assumed
to be small so that at most one failure and one neighborhood of secondary failures/outages
occur in (τ − dτ, τ). The expected number of disruptions E{N(d)(t)} occurred up to time t is
the sum of expected failures and outages (with secondary failures),
E{N(d)(t)} = E{N( f )(t)} + E{N(o)(t)}. (3.14)






3.4 Hurricane Ike and Large-Scale Real Data
The non-stationary spatial temporal model is now applied to studying the impact of a major


































Figure 3.3: Histogram of the disruptions and failure neighborhoods over time. Size of


































Figure 3.4: Histogram of the recoveries and recovery neighborhoods over time. Size of
elephants neighborhoods is more than 2.
recovery rates and to understand impacts of network structures.
3.4.1 Real Data and Processing
Hurricane Ike is one of the strongest hurricanes that occurred in 2008. Ike resulted in more
than two million customers without electricity in Louisiana and Texas [102]. A major utility
provider collected data on component failures and outages. Our data set consists of 2004
samples (failures or outages) that occurred from 7 a.m. September 12th to 4 a.m. September
14th, during which Hurricane Ike made the landfall. Each sample consists of occurrence
time, duration and location (latitude and longitude) of a disruption for a component in a
distribution network. The accuracy for time t is one minute.
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Figure 3.5: Histogram of the sizes of neighborhoods, where size 0 indicates isolated fail-
ures, outages or recoveries.
A failure neighborhood includes samples whose failure/ outage occurrences fall within
a minute. There are 204 failure neighborhoods of sizes 1 ∼ 72. The remaining 260 failures
occurred individually with minutes apart. Similarly, samples with recovery occurrences
within a minute are in a recovery neighborhood. There are 241 recovery neighborhoods
and 824 individual recoveries.
3.4.2 Empirical Non-Stationary Processes
We now study the empirical non-stationary processes, the impact of topological network
structures, and the resilience using the real data.
3.4.2.1 Empirical Disruption Process
We estimate empirical failure rate λ̂( f )(t) and disruption rate λ̂(d)(t) by aggregating over
the components. The disruption rate takes into account of failure neighborhoods. The
failure rate is calculated by aggregating disruptions occurred in a minute as one “failure”.
A simple moving average is used [104], where λ̂(w)(t) = 12τ
(
N̂(w)(t + τ) − N̂(w)(t − τ)
)
, with
τ = 1 hour, w = {d, f }. Figure 3.2(a) shows the disruption and failure rates respectively.
The rates and the failure neighborhoods are time-varying, showing the non-stationarity
of the disruption process. The failure rate increased to the peak value of 50 new failures per
hour around the landfall. The disruption rate exhibited a similar behavior but had a larger
peak value of 450 new disruptions per hour around the landfall.
The much larger disruption rate reflects the impact of dynamic network structure: There
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were a large number of correlated disruptions during the hurricane. This is further shown
in Figure 3.2(a) where large failure neighborhoods occurred mainly during the intense hur-
ricane period, with as many as 72 disruptions in one neighborhood. Hence, the network
components and topology were impacted by the hurricane differently during its evolution.
3.4.2.2 Empirical Recovery Process
Recovery rate λ̂(r)(t) and the size of recovery neighborhood v(r)i(t)(t) are estimated similarly
and shown in Figure 3.2(b). Two bursts of recoveries emerge. The first is infant recovery
that occurred along with major failures within six hours after the landfall. The second
is aging recovery that occurred about 7.7 hours after. The recovery rate and the size of
the recovery-neighborhoods vary with time, showing the non-stationarity of the recovery
process.
3.4.3 Neighborhoods: Impact of Network Structures
Dynamic failure neighborhoods are indicative of the impacts of topological network struc-
tures and the hurricane. The large failure neighborhoods around the landfall shown in
Figure 3.2(a) indicate that the hurricane induced a large number of correlated disruptions.
In contrast, failures that occurred individually happened mainly before and after the hur-
ricane. This suggests that correlated failures/outages occurred at the small time scale of
subminutes is a pertinent characteristic of the hurricane-induced disruptions.
Using the analogy of elephant and mice flows in computer communication [107], we
refer large neighborhoods as elephants, and small neighborhoods as mice. An 80/20 rule
emerges for the disruption process: Elephants failure neighborhoods of size more than 2
contribute to 74.3% of total disruptions as shown in Figure 3.3. However, the elephants fail-
ure neighborhoods amount to only 20.7% of the total failure neighborhoods. This implies
that the majority of disruptions are correlated and induced by elephant failures.
Unlike the disruptions, recovery neighborhoods follow the 60/90 rule: The mice recov-
ery neighborhoods of size 2 or less take up 92.7% of all recovery neighborhoods, amounting
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to 59.3% of recoveries, as shown in Figure 3.4. This suggests that around 60% recoveries
were uncorrelated, and thus required individual restorations.
Figure 3.5 compares the distributions of the sizes of the failure- and recovery-neighborhoods.
260 (about 13.0%) failures occurred individually whose neighborhood sizes are zero. In
contrast, there are 824 (about 41.1%) individual recoveries. Summarizing all observation,
failure and recovery processes exhibit significantly different characteristics: The major-
ity of the failures and outages occurred in correlation as elephants, however, recoveries
occurred in small patches as mice.
3.5 Conclusion
This work develops a spatial-temporal non-stationary random process to model large-scale
disruptions of power distribution induced by severe weather. The model combines non-
stationary failure- and recovery-random processes with network structures. Dynamic failure-
and recovery-neighborhoods are defined to characterize a topological network structure.
The neighborhoods characterize correlated failures and recoveries within networks. Dy-
namic disruption- and recovery-rates are used as simple quantities for failure- and recovery
processes at both component- and subnetwork-level. A resilience metric resulting from
the model then characterizes the evolution of failure and recovery. Real data from an
operational network during Hurricane Ike is used to study the resilience and the impact
of dynamic neighborhoods. An 80/20 rule emerges for failures, showing that hurricane-
induced power-disruptions are mostly correlated due to network structures. In contrast,
recoveries occur mainly in small patches, and thus required individual restorations. These
findings reveal disparities between large-scale failures and recoveries processes, suggesting




DATA ANALYSIS OF DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS ACROSS
MULTIPLE SERVICE REGIONS
In this chapter, we expand our study to including the impact of power infrastructure and
utility services. We analyse data from four major service regions representing Upstate New
York during Super Storm Sandy and daily operations. Using non-stationary spatiotemporal
random processes that relate infrastructural failures to recoveries and cost, our data analysis
shows that local power failures have a disproportionally large non-local impact on people
(i.e., the top 20% of failures interrupted 84% of services to customers). A large number
(89%) of small failures, represented by the bottom 34% of customers and commonplace de-
vices, resulted in 56% of the total cost of 28 million customer interruption hours. Our study
shows that extreme weather does not cause but rather exacerbates existing vulnerabilities,
which are obscured in daily operations.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 provides background knowl-
edge and describe the problem. Section 4.2 develops a problem formulation of dependent
non-stationary random processes that include the impact to customers (services and cost).
Section 4.3 describes the real data of power distribution failures of four system operators
from Hurricane Sandy. Section 4.4 presents the data analysis for the impact of power fail-
ures on the system infrastructures. Section 4.5 presents the data analysis for the impact (or
cost) of power failures on the utility services to the customers. Section 4.6 discusses our
findings and concludes the chapter.
4.1 Problem Statement
Severe weather disruptions, such as hurricanes and winter storms, have become an impor-
tant initiating cause of large-scale failures to the electric power grid. During Super Storm
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Sandy in 2012, power failures occurred across distribution system operators (DSOs) ser-
vice regions in 21 states, affecting more than 8.5 million customers [21]. Power distribution
(i.e., the final stage of energy infrastructure) is particularly vulnerable, representing ∼ 90%
of failures [6, 28]. Each disruption has left millions of people without electricity for days,
motivating the need to characterize resilience and ultimately re-design energy infrastruc-
ture [4, 6, 29].
Resilience is defined as the ability of the power grid to resist failures induced by exter-
nal hazards, to reduce their impacts on people as much as possible, and to rapidly restore
services to utility customers after disruptions [4, 6, 18, 108]. Although the frequency and
severity of extreme weather events vary, each event provides a unique opportunity to ex-
amine the otherwise hidden vulnerability (i.e., lack of resilience) of power grids. However,
the lack of comprehensive and sufficiently detailed failure and recovery data as well as an
attendant mathematical model has impeded such analyses. In addition to data granularity,
previous studies have been hampered by a lack of geographical scale spanning multiple
service territories.
The necessity of obtaining both high-resolution and large-scale failure data poses a
scientific challenge to studying resilience [9, 109]. Data on failure and recovery have tra-
ditionally been collected mainly for reporting purposes [21]. Such data are stored within
individual service territories, each managed by a DSO, and are not generally shared beyond
service regions. For example, U.S. federal and state governments only require aggregated
information such as the total customer service interruption duration from investor-owned
DSOs during major storms [6]. These data are often aggregated into hourly or daily statis-
tics over townships, too crude to study the resilience of the infrastructure and services. As
a result, there are only a small number of studies that utilize failure data from even one
service region [16, 30, 36–38].
A recent study examines power failures at a national scale across the United States
for daily operations, where the data are aggregated annually and over service territories
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[95]. At a regional scale, existing studies examine resilience in terms of economic impacts
through what-if scenarios (e.g., potential blackout due to failures of power transmission in
Los Angeles [110]). However, a resilience study that combines detailed failure data with a
large scale across multiple service territories does not hitherto exist.
In addition to real data, a resilience study requires the analytical modeling of failure,
recovery and costs with respect to time, geolocation, system location, customers, and their
interdependencies. Models capturing the economic impacts of these events are also needed
[110].
We study resilience characteristics by examining detailed data from both Super Storm
Sandy and daily operations across four major service regions representing Upstate New
York, an area of 50,590 square miles. We develop a model that integrates failure, recov-
ery and impact variables from the bottom up [48, 49]. The resulting model is multi-scale
in nature, starting from individual components, incorporating structures of power distribu-
tion and support to customers, then aggregating to DSO service regions (Methods). Fail-
ures, recoveries, and their customer impacts form non-stationary random processes that
are dependent on time, geolocation, and system location (Methods). Therefore, resilience
is a network property derived from the physical infrastructure to services and customers.
We characterize these interdependent processes with network-wide metrics, such as dis-
ruption rates, and time-varying failure/recovery probability distributions. These metrics
serve as guidelines for identifying vulnerabilities and quantifying time-varying cost using
large-scale real data (Methods). In particular, we demonstrate that extreme weather does
not cause, but rather exacerbates, certain existing infrastructural vulnerabilities; traditional
restoration approaches prioritizing disruptions that affect the highest number of customers
are inadequate for minimizing total customer outage times.
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4.2 Joint Disruption-Recovery-Cost Processes
4.2.1 Variables and Spatiotemporal Scales
We develop an analytical model for a larger number of interdependent variables at multiple
spatiotemporal scales. The variables are provided as follows:
• Failures induced by exogenous severe weather, outages caused by failures within a
distribution system (i.e., components that lose power due to a failure upstream but
are not damaged). A disruption refers to either a failure or an outage.
• Recoveries.
• Cost to customers.
• Characteristics of a device: Type, geo-location and system location.
Two temporal scales are considered. One is the time scale for failures to occur and recover,
in minutes, hours to days. The other is for outages to occur (and recover) within a distribu-
tion system, in subseconds [18]. Spatial scales start with components, extend to customers
in a given area such as a township, then aggregate to a service region.
4.2.2 Dependent Non-Stationary Processes
Modeling starts from a basic level of a node (i.e., a power component or a protective de-
vice). A node failure corresponds to either a damaged power component or an activated
protective device. Activated protective devices are included as failures since they interrupt
electricity supply to end users. Let Xi(t) be the status of node i at time t. Xi(t) = 1 corre-
sponds to failure and Xi(t) = 0 is normal. The occurrence of failure i is represented by an
indicator function I[F( f )i (t)], where F
( f )
i (t) = {Xi(t−∆t) = 0, Xi(t) = 1} is an event that node
i fails in time duration (t − ∆t, t] for sufficiently small ∆t > 0. I[] is an indicator function,
where I[A] = 1 if event A occurs; and I[A] = 0, otherwise.
For power distribution with a radial topology, a failure occurs locally without cascad-
ing [18]. However, a failure can cause outages where a node loses power without being
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damaged. For example, a failure at the upstream of a radial topology usually results in out-
ages at components downstream [18, 111]. The occurrence of an outage ( j) is represented
by an indicator function I[F(o)j (t)], where F
(o)
j (t) = {X j(t − ∆t) = 0, X j(t) = 1|Xi(t − ∆t) =
0, Xi(t) = 1}. We define Ni(t) as the neighborhood of failure i that consists of the induced
outages [18]. Then j ∈ Ni(t). The outages and the failure are assumed to occur at the same
time, i.e., I[F(o)j (t)|F
(i)
i (t)] = 1 for j ∈ Ni(t), as outages proceed a failure in subseconds [18].
A system disruption F(d)i (t) is either a failure (d = f ) or an outage (d = o). The occurrence
of a system disruption is denated as I(d)i (t) = I[F
(d)
i (t)] in Methods. In this work, we as-
sume that a disruption is already detected [13, 112]. This simplifies modeling; meanwhile,
enables us to use the real data collected from power distribution.
Recovery occurs when failures and outages are restored. The speed of recovery is
characterized by how long disruptions last. Let Dk(v) be the duration of a disruption that
occurs at node k and time v. Indicator function I[Dk(v) > t− v] represents a recovery event,
where a system disruption occurs at v is not yet recovered at t, 0 < v < t.
Reconfiguration is not included explicitly in modeling failures and outages. However,
disruption durations reflect the effect of reconfiguration that usually reduces the service
interruption time for customers.
Failures occur randomly in time and locations. For example, given a severe weather
event such as Super Storm Sandy, fallen debris can randomly induce failures (e.g., by
bringing down wires or resulting in nonfunctional substations). Likewise, recoveries in-
volve random factors such as terrene conditions in the aftermath of a severe weather event.
Recoveries also involve constraints such as restoration strategies, limited resources, and
planning. Spatiotemporal random processes [49] can thus be used to model failures and
recoveries:
1. Disruption process: {I[F(d)i (v)], i ∈ S (v), v > 0},
2. Recovery process: {I[Dk(v) > t − v], k ∈ S (t), 0 < v < t},
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3. Joint disruption-recovery process: {I[F(d)i (v)], I[Dk(v) > t − v], i ∈ S (v), k ∈ S (t), 0 <
v < t},
where S (v) and S (t) consist of nodes in normal operations at time v and disruptions at time
t respectively. Because disruptions are random and time-varying, so are S (v) and S (t). A
joint process results from the fact that disruptions and recoveries can occur concurrently in
an area.
A system disruption i at power distribution directly interrupts electricity service to cus-
tomers, and thus induces cost C(d)i (t). Disruption rate λ
(d)
i (t) is the first moment that charac-
terizes both the disruption process and its cost. In particular, λ(d)i (t) is the expected incre-
ment of cost ∆C(d)i (t) caused by system disruption i in (t −∆t, t]. Such a disruption rate can
be obtained from the stochastic equation [49,59]. Given S (t) (i.e., a set of nodes in normal
operation at t − ∆t),








where ∆Ai is a small area around location i. E[·] is the conditional expectation over ran-
domly occurring disruptions. For ∆t > 0 to be sufficiently small, at most one disruption
occurs in (t − ∆t, t].
As an example, assume the occurrence of disruption i incurs cost ci to the affected
customers. The cost to customers at time t from the failure and the outages are respectively,
C( f )i (t) = ciI
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As a special case, ci represents the number of affected customers. We then have the
customer disruption rate that is the expected number of newly affected customers per unit
time. The more customers affected by a system disruption, the higher the cost. Further-
more, when each disruption incurs unit cost ci = 1, the customer disruption rate reduces
to the system disruption rate, which is the average number of new failures and outages oc-
curred per unit time. Hence disruption rate λ(d)i (t) relates failures with power distribution
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infrastructure and impacts to customers.
As prolonged service interruptions are detrimental to customers, the cost needs to incor-
porate disruption durations. We consider disruption i that occurs in (v − ∆v, v]. Let Gi(v, t)
be the to customers evaluated at time t, which in general is a function f () of duration Di(v),
the cost of disruption occurrence C(d)i (v),
Gi(v, t) = fi(C
(d)
i (v),Di(v), t). (4.3)
The cost forms another spatiotemporal point process connecting system disruptions, recov-
eries and impacts on customers altogether:
{Gi(v, t), i ∈ S (v), 0 < v < t}, (4.4)
where t is the time for the cost to be assessed and v is when disruption i occurs.
We now adopt an assumption: Given the occurrence time v and the network state S (v), a
disruption and its recovery are conditionally independent [59]. The conditional expectation
of the cost given i ∈ S (v) can be characterized by the system failure rate and the conditional
expected cost,
E{I[F( f )i (v)]Gi(v, t)|S (v)}
≈ λ(d)i (v|S (v))∆vE[Gi(v, t)|S (v)].
(4.5)
Let Gi(v, t) include costs from failure i and its induced outages. The total cost at a given






i (v|S (v))E[Gi(v, t)|S (v)]}dv, (4.6)
where E[·|S (v)] is the conditional expectation over randomly occurring disruptions to com-
ponents previously in normal operation at the area. λ(d)i (v) is the system disruption rate. In-
tuitively, λ(d)i (v)dv is the average number of newly occurred system disruptions in (v−dv, v].
E[Gi(v, t)|S (v)] characterizes the cost from both the occurrence and recovery of disruption
i. λ(s)i (v|S (v))E[Gi(v, t)|S (v)]dv is the resulting total cost to the interrupted customers at time
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t, 0 < v < t. The integration adds up all system disruptions and thus all costs occurring in
[0, t].
An example cost is the total customer interruption time due to system disruption i
Gi(v, t) = ci min {Di(v), t − v}, (4.7)
where ci is the number of interrupted customers. When disruption i is already recovered
at time t, Di(v) < t − v, Gi(v, t) = ciDi(v). Otherwise, Gi(v, t) = ci(t − v). When summing
up over all disruptions, such cost is the aggregated customer interruption time, which is a
commonly used and simple economic cost by Distribution System Operators (DSOs) [64].
Such a cost can be measured using the available data.
As failures, recoveries and costs are dependent in a network setting, the above formu-
lation is stochastic in nature, i.e., derived from bottom-up, starting at the component level
and then resulting in network-wide quantities. The rates and the expected cost vary spa-
tially and temporally. Hence the disruption, recovery and cost processes are non-stationary
spatially and temporally. Furthermore, λ(d)i (v|S (v)) and E[Gi(v, t)|S (v)] are coupled with
network state S (v), resulting in non-linear relationships among disruptions and recoveries.
We consider the assumption as reasonable that a disruption and its downtime duration
are conditionally independent given the occurrence time v and network state S (v). For
example, when recovery prioritizes on restoring a source such as a non-functioning sub-
station, dependencies exist among downtime of disruptions that affect the highest number
of customers. However, given the occurrence of one disruption, its downtime exhibits ran-
domness (e.g., due to terrene conditions) which is conditionally independent of failure time.
If such an assumption is not adopted, the cost can still be computed but will lose intuitive
interpretation in terms of the disruption rate and the conditional expected cost.
4.2.3 Comparison with Prior Work
The cost in Equation 4.6 is motivated by and extends from non-stationary queuing network
and our prior works [16,18,59]. These prior works assume first-come-first-serve policy for
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restoration which does not apply to recovery strategies with priorities used by DSOs. The
cost obtained in this work includes not only temporal but also spatial variables. Moreover,
our formulation extends the previous works to include costs on customers. As customers
are supported by power distribution infrastructure, the formulation must be bottom-up, i.e.,
starting from individual components, each of which supports various customers. Therefore,
aggregated models such as those in the prior work [59] cannot be applied to this work by
brute force. One other related work uses reactive point processes to model failures and
their evolution [93]. There, parametric models are learned for failure rates; recovery and
costs are not considered.
In a broader context, simulation models are developed for resilience under potential
large-scale blackout [110]. The models emphasize on economic impacts of blackouts and
benefit to resilience through using external resources. Failures and recoveries are not a fo-
cus, nor their linkage to cost at the detailed spatiotemporal scales. The types of failures are
drawn from what-if scenarios at power transmission, which is different from the actual dis-
ruptions and recoveries occurring at power distirbution. Vulnerabilities are studied for the
energy infrastructure under the rising temperature and climate change [5,113]. These mod-
els include simulations on weather variables; use topological data from the power grids;
thus have a different focus from this work [5].
To complement the prior works, the model derived here exhibits an analytical form on
interdependent processes from fine to aggregated spatiotemporal scales. The model charac-
terizes infrastructural failures, restoration by DSOs, and costs to customers in a networked
setting. This enables the use of sufficiently detailed real data, resulting in realistic aspects
of resilience that complements the existing what-if scenarios. Limited by the available data
on cost, our model is applied so far to a simple cost measure commonly used by DSO in
Equation 4.7. The current model does not include weather variables.
In summary, the following quantities are used to quantify the first moments of disrup-
tion, recovery and cost processes: System and customer disruption rates, probabilities of
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disruption durations (or conditional probability distributions of downtime durations given
the top percentage of disruptions), and expected cost. These quantities are used in data
analysis described by the subsequent sections.
4.3 Data Description
Real data used in this work are both sufficiently detailed and at a large scale. Data are rarely
available that provides detailed information at power distribution (e.g., the occurrence and
restoration time as well as the geo-location on each failure and recovery). Data in this
work are provided by four DSOs in Upstate New York. DSO 1 and DSO4 are medium-
size distribution system operators (i.e., each serving < 500, 000 customers) while DSO 2
and DSO3 are large system operators (i.e., each serving > 500, 000 customers) [92]. The
four DSOs have disjointed service territories, spanning more than 50, 950 square miles.
The data set consists of 6,266 system disruptions that occurred during the four-day period
(10/28/2012 ∼ 10/31/2012) when Super Storm Sandy affected Upstate New York (Table
4.1). As many as 646,768 customers lost electricity service. The data sets also consist of
31,721 disruptions during daily operations in the same year.
The data contain detailed information regarding failures and recoveries at the final stage
of the electric grid (Table 4.1). Each data sample consists of the following common infor-
mation across the four service territories: (1) Time when the first customer reported loss
of power, (2) time when power was restored, (3) the number of customers affected, (4) the
type(s) of activated protective device(s), (5) geo-location and system location of an acti-
vated protective device. Activated protective devices include blown fuses at feeders and
transformers, open substation breakers and reclosers. The accuracy of each sample is a
minute in time, latitude and longitude in geo-locations. System locations of the activated
protective devices are provided in terms of the hierarchy (i.e., primary distribution, sec-
ondary distribution and customer properties). From the data sets, the cost can be obtained
as customer interruption time but not the actual economic loss used in [110].
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Table 4.1: Data sets. Size: Number of disruptions and the number of affected customers.
Occurrence time: time durations in which the disruptions occurred. Time accuracy of
disruption and recovery: one minute. Location accuracy: latitude and Longitude for each
disruption. The data sets are preprocessed to remove the disruptions from intentional or
prearranged operations, and small storms for normal daily operations.
Daily Operation Super Storm Sandy
Disruptions (Occurrence time) Affected Customers Disruptions (Occurrence time) Affected Customers
DSO 1 5643 (10/28/2011 ∼ 10/28/2012) 302688 1334 (7:43am 10/28/2012 ∼ 12:59 pm 10/31/2012) 109392
DSO 2 9992 (10/1/2011 ∼ 10/28/2012) 764988 1184 (1:53 am 10/28/2012 ∼ 12:51pm 10/31/2012) 113488
DSO 3 13063 (1/1/2012 ∼ 10/28/2012) 961114 1866 (1:58 am 10/28/2012 ∼ 12:57pm 10/31/2012) 249339
DSO 4 3023 (1/1/2012 ∼ 10/28/2012) 225997 1882 (2:39 am 10/28/2012 ∼ 12:56pm 10/31/2012) 174549
Total 31721 2254787 6266 646768
The data set from DSO4 has the following exceptions on protective devices. The infor-
mation on system locations is only provided for activated protective devices at the primary
distribution. Two thirds of the samples do not have the recovery time specified uniquely on
the types of disrupted devices. Hence, when the cost is examined with respect to different
types of devices (Table 4.3), data samples used are ony those disruptions that are uniquely
identified by their device types. This results in a reduced data set of 5171 samples used for
(Table 4.3).
Overall, it is challenging to obtain sufficiently accurate data during a severe weather
event, where data accuracy can be compromised when the impact is severe. The data from
Upstate New York are sufficiently accurate, and thus chosen for this study. Although the
time of a disruption was taken from the customer calls, the occurrence time is expected to
be reasonably accurate (i.e., in minutes) at Upstate New York. This is because there were
often multiple calls from customers reporting loss of electricity, especially during a severe
weather event.
4.3.1 Super Storm Sandy
Super Storm Sandy was one of the most damaging natural disasters that occurred in 2012.
During Super Storm Sandy, power distribution was disrupted for more than 29 DSOs in
eight most impacted northeastern states, affecting 8,511,251 customers at the peak of the
storm [21]. As reported by National Hurricane Center [114], the storm started to impact
the Northeastern coast of the United on October 28, 2012, and the center of the storm made
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landfall at about 11:30 p.m. UTC in New Jersey. After the landfall, the storm turned toward
the west and then northeast and gradually weakened. The center of the storm became ill
defined and the hurricane was considered dissipated after 12 a.m. October 31 UTC [114].
We identify when the service territories were under the impact of Super Storm Sandy
based on the following information: the observed best-track of the hurricane [115], the
radius of the hurricane-force winds and the tropical-storm-force winds [116]. As the result,
October 28 to October 31 2012 is considered as the dominant period of the hurricane for
the four DSOs in Upstate New York.
4.3.2 GIS Database
ArcMap, an ArcGIS product, was used to process the data on geo-locations. In particular,
spatial analyses were utilized to compare such factors as system locations and DSO ser-
vice regions, in addition to converting coordinate systems to standard GPS coordinates for
plotting. The coordinate system for data was mixed between the United States State Plane
Coordinate System (SPCS) in survey feet and the Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM)
grid system, using suitable zone codes for New York State. No precision was lost in the
coordinate transformation. The resulting GPS coordinates are significant up to and includ-
ing the sixth decimal place or 0.11 meters, which was more than suitable for our needs. A
shape file for the service territory boundaries of the four DSOs was provided by the New
York State Department of Public Service.
4.4 Infrastructural Vulnerability
Failures that occurred with respect to power distribution during a severe weather event are
largely due to local causes (e.g., fallen debris, damaged poles and area flooding). Unlike
transmission systems [51, 117, 118], such failures typically do not cascade in radial power
distribution designs. This is problematic because the majority of power distribution for our
four DSOs has an overhead radial topology and corresponding protective devices [108].
Failures induced by severe weather can result in outages to downstream devices, which
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Figure 4.1: System and customer disruption rates of the four DSOs. The rates represent
the number of new system (or customer) disruptions per minute. Shaded areas illustrate the
error bounds at the 95% confidence interval.
lose power without being damaged (see Section SI1). Nevertheless, disruptions (i.e., either
failures or outages) resulting from exogenous events are expected to remain largely local
(at individual devices and geolocations [1, 108]). Here, a fundamental question arises: Is
the impact of a local failure is also local, affecting only a small number of customers?
Disruption rates, which correspond to the marginal temporal costs per unit time, provide
an answer (Methods). In evaluating customers and system-level disruptions, we find that
a common behavior emerges for the four DSOs shown in Figure 4.1. During Super Storm
Sandy, customer disruption rates were 93 to 193 times larger than system disruption rates.
These higher rates demonstrate the existence of infrastructural vulnerability, in which local
failures have a distinctly non-local impact on customers (Figure 4.6(a)). In fact, the top
20% of system disruptions affected 79% ∼ 89% of customers for the four DSOs, and each
such disruption interrupted services for more than 74 ∼ 107 customers.
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4.4.1 Generalized Scaling Law
To quantify the prevalence of non-local impacts on customers, we analyze the dependence
between infrastructural failures and affected customers. Because operational power dis-
tribution systems are based on engineering design and exhibit irregularities, the scaling
behavior we observe (e.g., 20 ∼ 80) cannot be represented using a simple power law dis-
tribution [119]. Thus, we obtain a generalized scaling law drawn from the data: a mapping
between probability W(x) for a customer affected by a disruption that interrupts electricity
service for more than x users and probability P(x) of such a disruption. Taking DSO 1 as
an example, the generalized scaling law demonstrates that the top 0.1% ∼ 76% of system
disruptions affected 2% ∼ 99.6% of all customers at the 90% confidence interval (Supple-
mentary Table A.3). A similar generalized scaling law applies to the other three DSOs,
with small variations, as shown in Figure 4.2(a) (and Supplementary Table A.3).
4.4.2 Comparison to Daily Operations
Do exogenous events, such as Super Storm Sandy, create the infrastructural vulnerability
or instead exacerbate an underlying lack of resilience? We apply the methodology outlined
above to daily operations to show that vulnerability is inherent to the power distribution
infrastructure. Using data on failures in daily operations from the year prior to the hurri-
cane, a similar non-local impact on customers holds (Figure 4.2(b), Supplementary Figure
A.2 and Supplementary Table A.3). The mapping between the two probabilities differs by
less than 2% ∼ 9% for daily operations and Super Storm Sandy at the 95% confidence
level. Thus, customers interrupted by disruptions in daily operations and the storm follow
a similar scaling law. Compared to Super Storm Sandy, each disruption in daily operations
affected 29, 19, 48, and 21 fewer customers for the four respective DSOs. The similarity
between the scaling laws for the storm and daily operations demonstrates that Super Storm
Sandy did not create but only exacerbated the non-local impacts on customers.
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4.4.3 Cause of Infrastructure Vulnerability
Although the overhead power distribution infrastructure is a complex combination of topol-
ogy, protection schemes, and supporting mechanism for customers, the four service regions
have a common radial and hierarchical structure. The infrastructure and disruptions can be
represented by three commonly used system locations [1]: primary distribution, secondary
distribution, and customer property. A disruption at the top level can disconnect customers
away from a power source in the existing overheard power distribution [18] due to a lack
of reconfiguration and distributed generation. Demonstrated by the data (Figure 4.3(a)),
among the top 20% of disruptions from Super Storm Sandy, approximately 77% occurred
at the primary distribution; each such disruption affected ∼ 524 customers on average.
The remaining 23% of disruptions occurred at the secondary distribution, each of which
affected ∼ 218 customers on average.
The impact of the hierarchical design on the number of affected customers is further
characterized by the five major types of activated protective devices at the corresponding
system locations and through the generalized scaling law (Figure 4.2(b), Figure 4.3(b),
Supplementary Figure A.2). For example, non-functional substations, open reclosers, and
blown fuses at primary distribution almost exclusively represent the top 20% of disruptions
that occurred during both Super Storm Sandy and daily operations; the same type of devices
had a non-local impact on customers regardless of weather. Thus, the hierarchical structure
is an important underlying cause of the infrastructural vulnerability for overhead power
distribution with a radial topology.
4.4.4 Infrastructural Vulnerability Exacerbated by Super Storm Sandy
The degree to which Super Storm Sandy exacerbated the infrastructural vulnerability is
characterized by the non-stationary probability distribution P1(t) for at least one disruption
occurring in a service region at time t measured in a minute. Using empirical data from both
Super Storm Sandy and daily operations (Supplementary Equation A.3), we find that P1(t)
was less than 0.02 per minute in daily operations but increased to 1.0 at the peak impact
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of the storm. The increase in the probability was particularly pronounced for the top (e.g.,
20%) disruptions, in which P1(t) was less than 0.003 in daily operations but increased
to the maximum values of 0.6 ∼ 1.0 during the storm for the four DSOs (Figure 4.3,
Figure A.3 and Supplementary Table A.4). Further relating to the hierarchy, the probability
of a disruption at the primary distribution shows a disproportionally large increase of 28
times for the top 20%, compared with 15 times at the two remaining levels (Figure 3(a)
and Supplementary Figure A.4(a)). Thus, our study demonstrates that the infrastructural
vulnerability was only present at low levels during daily operations until magnified by
severe weather events such as Super Storm Sandy.
4.5 Impact to Service and Cost
Multiple failures (i.e., 6,266 system disruptions occurred during Super Storm Sandy) chal-
lenge the state of the art in recovery [108]. Demonstrated by the data from our DSOs (Fig-
ure 4.4), in daily operations, 90% of the interrupted customers recovered within 6 hours,
and all services were restored in one day (Figure 4.4). However, recoveries from Super
Storm Sandy lasted 8, 4, 10, and 15 days for the four DSOs.
4.5.1 Recovery
We quantify recovery through the interdependence between failure and recovery processes.
The probability density functions of downtime duration given the top percentage of dis-
ruptions exhibit a common characteristic in Figure 4.5 for the four service regions during
Super Storm Sandy. Disruptions that affected the highest number of customers were usu-
ally restored at an early stage of recovery (i.e., the first 24%, 8%, 15%, and 34% of the
total restoration time) with peak probability density (0.006, 0.04, 0.003, and 0.002 per
minute, respectively). These high-customer disruptions with early recovery constitute so-
called Category 1 (”large and early”), amounting to 9% of the total system disruptions;
each affected more than 89 customers (Section SI5). Such a characteristic reflects a com-
mon practice of repairs: power sources, such as substations, are restored first, followed by
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other components downstream. Such a pattern of recovery persists through daily opera-
tions except that all disruptions are restored rapidly in minutes or hours (Supplementary
Figure A.7). The remaining disruptions are in so-called Category 2, which mainly consists
of “small” system disruptions, each of which either affects the bottom 34% of customers
or is represented by a common place device, such as a fuse (89%). Category 2 disruptions
dominate the late stage of recovery at the four service regions almost exclusively (Supple-
mentary Figure A.6). Category 2 also consists of a small number of disruptions (2%) that
affected a large number of customers but recovered late (Table 4.2 and Section SI5).
4.5.2 Cost
The total service cost quantifies the impact of prolonged disruptions on customers, which,
as a special case of Equation 4.6, is measured as the total customer interruption time by
the data set. Aggregating over only disruptions occurred during the first four days when
Super Storm Sandy impacted Upstate New York, the four service territories together expe-
rienced approximately 28 million customer hours of interruptions. The “small” disruptions
in Category 2 together contribute to approximately 56% of the total cost but only amount to
34% affected customers (Table 4.2). Thus, while “large” disruptions (9% of the total) that
affected the highest number of customers were restored early, the large number of small
disruptions together (89% of the total) contribute to the major cost (Table 4.2). This illus-
trates that the aggregation of Category 2 disruptions from low-customer and small-device
disruptions results in a disproportionately larger portion of the total cost. Hence, the total
service cost in Figure 4.6 (b) exhibits a different behavior than the generalized scaling law
for disruptions in Figure 4.6 (a). This suggests that recovery, which is compounded by
restoration strategies, available resources, the infrastructural vulnerability and the cost of
enhancement, requires consideration of the overall cost of restoration in addition to indi-
vidual disruptions that affect the highest number of customers.
We further examine the service cost in terms of disrupted devices and the power distri-
bution hierarchy. Data samples with clearly labeled device types are used for this purpose
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(Methods). The total cost for the reduced data sets is 20 million customer interruption
hours (Table 4.3). Approximately 32% of the total cost results from disruptions by “large
devices” (i.e., open substation/circuit breakers and reclosers, as well as non-functioning
transformers at the primary distribution). These interrupted devices resulted in 47% of the
affected customers. Approximately 69% of the “large devices” are in Category 1 (i.e., re-
covered “early”). In contrast, 94% blown fuses and other interrupted devices at the lower
levels of the system hierarchy are Category 2 ”small” disruptions. These interrupted de-
vices amounted to 53% interrupted customers but 68% of the 20 million customer disrup-
tion hours (Table 4.3).
This implies that aggregation of the small devices represented by blown fuses and other
components at lower level of the system hierarchy, although each affected a moderate num-
ber of customers, resulted in a larger portion of the total customer downtime. This again
suggests that the early recovery of the components that affected the highest number of
customers is insufficient for reducing the total cost to end-users.
Data from daily operations is also studied for disrupted devices as a comparison (Ta-
ble 4.3). Disruptions in normal daily operations are clearly identified with the types of
interrupted devices by the four DSOs. Open substation breakers and reclosers as well as
non-functioning transformers at primary distribution amounted to 47% of the interrupted
customers and 29% of customer interruption hours. Therefore, a similar disparity of the
costs is observed in daily operations between major devices at the primary distribution and
the others at the lower levels of the system hierarchy (Table 4.3). Hence, a similar trend
of recovery on prioritizing disruptions that affected the highest number of customers is
observed for daily operations.
4.6 Discussion and Conclusion
Using large-scale data collected by DSOs in Upstate New York, we obtain critical insights
revealing that severe weather events, such as Super Storm Sandy, do not fundamentally
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cause infrastructural vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities are inherently a complement of infras-
tructure resilience and exist regardless of exogenous factors. Although such infrastructural
vulnerabilities may manifest themselves locally, together, they have a profoundly non-local
impact on customers. We characterize this asymmetrical relationship between disruptions
and affected customers using the generalized scaling law estimated empirically from the
data. The similarities of the scaling law for different service territories, and for Super
Storm Sandy and daily operations, suggest that the infrastructural vulnerability exists in-
dependently of the exogenous events themselves and their effects. Whereas the number of
DSOs analyzed is small, their combined service regions span nearly the entirety of Upstate
New York. A large-scale analysis of data from multiple DSOs is necessary to understand
the prevalence of such vulnerabilities and as a control against exogenous events [83]. As
industry increasingly realizes the importance of data collection and study beyond experi-
ences [83], the availability of more detailed data [12], especially regarding restoration and
the root causes of failures, may allow for further analysis in recovery dynamics and yield
optimal cooperative strategies.
When the recovery process was compounded by multiple factors (e.g., infrastructure
vulnerability, cost of enhancement, impacts from severe weather, and available resources),
the restoration was apt to prioritize the recovery of disruptions that affected the highest
number of customers during both the storm and daily operations. Although such system
disruptions incur major costs, the aggregation of smaller disruptions proved to be a sig-
nificant factor that must be considered in recovery. Unfortunately, recovery is also com-
pelled by constraints introduced by the current power distribution infrastructure: major
components, such as substations, must be repaired first due to a lack of distributed genera-
tion. Moreover, whereas some failures are easily repairable (resetting breakers or replacing
fuses), others may be arduous to restore due to damaged power components or external cir-
cumstances, such as flooding [89]. Therefore, multiple factors should be considered jointly
when designing enhancement options and recovery strategies for resilience. DSOs must
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weigh the impact of infrastructural vulnerability against the economic and societal costs of
such improvements [110], in addition to factors not considered in this section, such as life
cycle cost [60].
Resilience has a profound impact at all scales, from DSOs to states and nations. Ideally,
the inclusion of additional weather data would enable a more comprehensive analysis of
power distribution under the effect of extreme meteorological events and, more broadly,
climate change [5, 113, 120]. It is challenging for multiple organizations to participate
in a large-scale study with detailed organizational data due to a variety of issues, ranging
from proprietary information and confidentiality among DSOs to governmental regulations.
Using data from a portion of the geographic area affected by Super Storm Sandy, this
work demonstrates the feasibility and potential for multiple DSOs and policy makers to
collaborate with a common goal of resilience and to make meaningful advances.
As the power industry traditionally learns from severe weather through experience
[83, 111], this work demonstrates how the knowledge of resilience can be learned from
large-scale data. We have created a theoretical framework that provides a system per-
spective, starting with detailed information, on infrastructural vulnerabilities, service, and
cost to customers by employing spatiotemporal non-stationary random processes. Such a
model connects interdependent networks from the infrastructure and DSOs to customers.
Moreover, we demonstrate the potential and feasibility of large-scale data analysis guided
by modeling at the final stage of the energy grid. Advancing data collection and analysis
will benefit DSOs, customers, and policy makers alike, moving all of us toward a resilient
energy infrastructure. We hope that our study stimulates more organizations to actively
participate in resilience studies.
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Table 4.2: Cost. Cost is estimated from the data as the number of affected customers and
customer interruption hours for the two categories during Super Storm Sandy. Category
1: system disruptions that affected relatively large numbers of customers and recovered
early. Category 2 (Small): disruptions that either affected a relatively small number of
customers or on commonplace devices. Category 2 (Large/late): disruptions that affected a
large number of customers but recovered late.
Disruptions Customers Customer Interruption Hours
Category 1 Category 2 Category 2 Category 1 Category 2 Category 2 Category 1 Category 2 Category 2
(Large/Early) (Small) (Large/Late) (Large/Early) (Small) (Large/Late) (Large/Early) (Small) (Large/Late)
DSO 1 102 1228 4 61461 44080 3851 645268 2060193 198880
DSO 2 109 1055 16 68848 30426 14040 113404 284584 90927
DSO 3 154 1635 77 93897 79108 76334 623126 5569573 5342695
DSO 4 186 1618 5 99350 63161 4960 4297389 7701248 812104
Total 551 5536 102 323556 216775 99185 5679187 15615598 6444606
Total 6189 639516 27739390
Fraction 8.9% 89.4% 1.6% 50.6% 33.9% 15.5% 20.5% 56.3% 23.2%
Table 4.3: Estimated cost with respect to the two groups of most affected devices. The
first type (“1”) includes substation breakers, reclosers, and transformers located at primary
distribution. The second (“2”) includes blown fuses and the other affected devices at the
secondary distribution and customer property. Partial data of DSO4 is used whose durations
are uniquely identified by the device types.
Hurricane
Customers Customer Interruption Hours
Group of Devices 1 2 1 2
Category 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
DSO 1 40562 8957 20899 38974 379818 500827 265451 175824681.9% 18.1% 34.9% 65.1% 43.1% 56.9% 13.1% 86.9%
DSO 2 51415 17329 17433 27311 80714 122338 32689 25206174.8% 25.2% 39.0% 61.0% 39.8% 60.2% 11.5% 88.5%
DSO 3 49469 70379 29846 75122 278769 4791444 320530 527601141.3% 58.7% 28.4% 71.6% 5.5% 94.5% 5.7% 94.3%
DSO 4 2981 1415 34731 33450 86744 147021 1511251 400648767.8% 32.2% 50.9% 49.1% 37.1% 62.9% 27.4% 72.6%
Total 144427 98080 102909 174857 826045 5561630 2129921 11292805
Fraction 27.8% 18.8% 19.8% 33.6% 4.1% 28.1% 10.8% 57.0%
Total 242507 277766 6387675 13422726
Fraction 46.6% 53.4% 32.2% 67.8%
Total 520273 19810401
Daily Operations
Customers Customer Interruption Hours
Group of Devices 1 2 1 2
Category 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
DSO 1 58207 32870 83207 115353 55505 124957 94143 37949263.9% 36.1% 41.9% 58.1% 30.8% 69.2% 19.9% 80.1%
DSO 2 315091 94595 102923 244133 302428 358424 124660 73548576.9% 23.1% 29.7% 70.3% 45.8% 54.2% 14.5% 85.5%
DSO 3 147819 177919 67072 304153 153533 813071 64357 151144945.4% 54.6% 18.1% 81.9% 15.9% 84.1% 4.1% 95.9%
DSO 4 20000 10847 10381 29671 23575 49820 12732 10937664.8% 35.2% 25.9% 74.1% 32.1% 67.9% 10.4% 89.6%
Total 541117 316231 263583 693310 535042 1346272 295892 2735802
Fraction 29.9% 17.4% 14.5% 38.2% 10.9% 27.4% 6.0% 55.7%
Total 857348 956893 1881314 3031694




























































































































Figure 4.2: Generalized scaling law. (a) For the four DSOs during Super Storm Sandy: em-
pirical probability W̃(x) of the number of affected customers, where each of the disruptions
affected more than x customers, and empirical probability P̃(x) that a disruption affected
more than x customers. Shaded areas illustrate the estimation error at the 95% confidence
level. (b) For DSO 1 during Super Storm Sandy and daily operations as an illustration.
Types of disrupted devices are shown on the right with respect to the number of interrupted
customers. The histogram shows the percentage of customers from the storm and the daily
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Figure 4.3: Empirical probability of disruptions. (a) Empirical probability distribution
P(Top %, level) of the top percentage of disruptions at the three levels of the hierarchy
from the storm and daily operations. The horizontal axis shows the percentage of dis-
ruptions from 0 (the very top) to 100% and level represents the primary and secondary
distributions as well as customer properties. The vertical axis shows the empirical prob-
ability distribution per minute for every 1% of the disruptions. (b) Empirical probability
distribution f (Top %, level, device) of system disruptions specified further by the type of
device at the three levels of the hierarchy for Super Storm Sandy. The five types are chosen
from the most disrupted devices in the data set.
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Figure 4.4: Scatter plots of downtime durations during the storm (top row) and daily op-
erations (bottom row). Each data point corresponds to a disruption. The horizontal and
vertical coordinates are the time of the disruption occurrence and recovery, respectively.
The diagonal line represents the same disruption and recovery occurrence time. The dis-
tance of the disruptions above the diagonal line indicates the delay (i.e., downtime). The




































































































Figure 4.5: Probability density function of recovery. f (d|z): probability density function
of downtime duration d given the top z percentage of disruptions for the four DSOs during
Super Storm Sandy. The number of customers is given for each corresponding percentage.
(a) (b)
Figure 4.6: Geographical distribution of the cost in Upstate New York during Super Storm
Sandy: (a) number of disrupted customers; (b) customer interruption hours (CMI). Colors
in (a) represent top 20% versus the remaining disruptions. Colors in (b) represent Category
1 and Category 2 disruptions. Each marker represents a system disruption. The size of a




DYNAMIC RESILIENCE OF POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS
In this chapter, we develop a resilience metric from bottom-up that incorporates such perti-
nent characteristics as non-stationary failure-recovery processes and impacts to customers.
The metric builds from our prior work that derives a problem formulation and a spatiotem-
poral model [16, 18]. The modeling starts from failures and recoveries at individual com-
ponents. Topological dependence of disruptions and recoveries in power distribution is
characterized through a dynamic topology [18]. Component disruptions and recoveries are
then aggregated to a larger spatial scale of a service region and temporal scale of min-
utes or beyond. Dependent failures and recoveries are thus characterized by non-stationary
spatiotemporal random processes [16]. We further include impacts on customers in the
model. As customers are connected with the infrastructure (i.e., power distribution sys-
tems), this requires a bottom-up formulation from random failures to recoveries and costs
to customers. The resulting model is a coupled non-stationary random process on costs,
allowing us to measure not only the resilience of the infrastructure but combined impacts
with services on customers.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 introduces the concept of
resilience. Section 5.2 reviews the existing and ongoing works of resilience metrics and dis-
cusses the invalidity of the existing metrics. Section 5.3 derives a temporal resilience metric
from the temporal failure-recovery processes that is formulated in Chapter 2. Section 5.4
derives a spatiotemporal resilience metric from the spatiotemporal dependent random pro-
cesses in Chapter 3. Section 2.7 discusses and concludes the chapter.
5.1 Resilience Concept
Resilience is a system measure in response to exogenous disruptions. Here a system cor-
responds to large-scale power distribution, and exogenous disruptions are severe weather
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events. Definitions and approaches on resilience are extensible beyond power distribu-
tion under severe weather [23]. Various definitions have been provided previously (for
example, [4, 6, 29, 61], just to name a few). Despite the differences in terminologies, the
definitions share a common concept that resilience is the capacity of a system to adapt to
changes from environments and the climate [6]. In relating to severe weather disruptions
of the infrastructure, resilience is defined through the two aspects:
• The ability to avoid failures under exogenous disruptions,
• The ability to restore services rapidly if failures occur.
Industry adopts similar definitions of resilience, with an emphasis on providing seamless
services to customers. Rapid recovery from damages is the focus of power utilities in the
U.S. [31, 62]. This corresponds to the second aspect of resilience. The first aspect is often
related to as hardening the power grid [31]. Hence, resilience adopted by power utilities
also involves two aspects.
Resilience is a dynamic measure for the system performance in major disruptions. Dis-
tributed backup resources and highly flexible new loads are designed and installed, which
makes today’s power distribution system more dynamic [63]. The dynamic infrastructure
further results in the dynamic system performance that evolves with environment changes,
and finally the dynamic system resilience [6].
5.2 Resilience Metrics
Existing resilience metrics can be grouped to static metrics or dynamic metrics, depending
on whether time variable is involved.
5.2.1 Existing and Ongoing Metrics
Most of existing resilience metrics are static metrics, which characterize the average mea-
sures of system performance. Power utilities use widely the IEEE defined standard sustained-
interruption indices, such as System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI) and
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System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) [64]. SAIFI/SAIDI characterize the
system reliability in daily operations excluding major storm events [64]. To evaluate the
severe weather events, SAIFI was revised to Storm Average Interruption Frequency In-
dex (STAIFI) [65], and SAIDI was revised to Storm Average Interruption Duration Index
(STAIDI) [66].
STAIFI =
Total Number of Customers Interrupted
Total Number of Customers Served
, (5.1)
STAIDI =
Total Customer Storm Interruption Minutes
Total Number of Customers Served
. (5.2)
They both aggregate the number of interrupted customers and customer interruption dura-
tions over an entire major storm.
There are other static metrics, such as the Estimated Time of Restoration (ETR) [62]
and fragility [45]. These static metrics are also average measures and have the similar
problems.
Estimated Time of Restoration (ETR) is another metric used by industry [83]. ETR
informs customers of the expected time needed for restoring services after failures. While
appealing to users, ETR is difficult to estimate accurately because of the uncertainty and
dynamics from non-stationary failure and recovery processes.
Fragility and its variations relate failures to weather variables [45, 65, 67, 121]. Such a
relationship is necessary to view resilience through potential threats, and thus is promising
to characterize a performance metric. A challenge is how to include dynamics and system-
wide performance in such a resilience measure.
Dynamic metrics such as Quality and its variations (i.e., Robustness and Rapidity)
characterize over time parts of a system or the number of customers in normal opera-
tions [23, 71, 122]. These metrics include dynamic evolution of resilience but are based
on pre-assumed functions of time.
Questions arising include, what factors should a resilience metric include; and how
to derive such a metric. In principle, a resilience measure should include pertinent factors
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from weather to failures, recoveries, impacts on customers, DSOs and policy makers [123].
As resilience quantifies system-wide performance, a fundamental approach is to derive
such a metric from bottom-up based on modeling, including weather variables as potential
causes, then failures, recoveries, and impacts as consequences [18, 19].
Grounded by the spatiotemporal model, resilience metrics in recent work are derived
from the bottom-up to incorporate parts of the factors: non-stationary failure-recovery pro-
cesses and impacts to customers [18,19]. However, weather and other exogenous variables
are not included. A metric R(t) is defined as












is the expected cost/impact in time t [18, 19]. d > 0 is a threshold on
tolerable delays for recovery. C0 is a normalization factor. R(t) = 1 indicates the best
resilience and R(t) = 0 is non-resilience. 1 − R(t) is the percentage of cost or impact,
evolving with occurrences of failures and recoveries.
The impact/cost has been derived using failure-recovery processes developed through
non-stationary queuing models [18, 19]. Data from Hurricane Ike has been used to obtain
the value of the metric for an operational power distribution grid [18, 19]. The failure-
recovery-cost processes in Section 1.2.2 [11] can potentially be used to evaluate the im-
pact/cost on customers. Thus resilience metrics depend critically on modeling and data.
5.2.2 Invalidity of Standard Metrics
Are new metrics needed for resilience in the first place? We now compute STAIFI and
STAIDI values for major storm events as an example. The objective is to find whether
STAIFI/STAIDI have large errors for major storms [22].
Now consider a data set from a service region during Super Storm Sandy in Upstate
New York. Each data sample is on a failure signified by an activated protective device with
the occurrence time, duration and number of customers affected. There are 1334 failures
from October 28, 2012 to October 31, 2012 (see [11] for details). The STAIFI and STAIDI
90
values and their standard deviations are obtained using Equations (1) and (2) and shown in
Fig. 5.1. The standard deviations are so large for both indices that they allow a negative
quantity when the error bars are taken into consideration. Such large deviations suggest that
STAIFI and STAIDI exhibit too much uncertainty to be valid for characterizing resilience.
Therefore, extending, by brute force, the reliability standards to resilience metrics is not
viable.
Having the large standard deviation is not a coincidence but results naturally from non-
stationary failure-recovery processes. Non-stationary random processes can of course ex-
hibit time-varying mean functions [11, 16, 59]. This is clearly shown by the time-varying
version of STAIFI and STAIDI from Equations (1) and (2) that are computed using samples
at one-hour intervals in Fig. 5.1. In contrast, the STAIFI and STAIDI are static sample av-
erages by definition, thus insufficient for representing non-stationary failure and recovery
processes.
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Figure 5.1: STAIFI and STAIDI values from a service region during Super Storm Sandy.
The histogram shows the number of interrupted customers per hour. The error bars corre-
spond to the standard deviation.
5.3 Temporal Resilience
In this section, we formulate the resilience based on the temporal process of failures and
recoveries that is derived in Chapter 2, and apply such temporal metric to the real data.
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5.3.1 Definition
As failure and recovery processes are dynamic, a resilience metric should be dynamic also.
Furthermore, how resilience varies with time should result from the dynamic model of
failure-recovery processes. Following such a principle, we define resilience from bottom-
up, starting with one node. Probability Pr{Xi(t) = 0} that node i is in normal operations
characterizes the ability to resist to failures at time t . Probability of infant recovery
Pr{Di(t) < d0} characterizes the ability of the node to quickly recover. Combining these
two abilities, we define resilience as follows.
Definition 3 Resilience of a node
Given threshold value d0 > 0 on failure durations, resilience ri(t) for node i is the
probability that the node is either functioning or exhibiting infant recovery, where
Ri(t) = Pr{Xi(t) = 0} + Pr{Di(t) < d0, Xi(t) = 1}. (5.4)
Aggregating the resilience of nodes over an entire network, (system) resilience R(t) is
the expected percentage of nodes that are either functioning or recovering within d0 upon
failures.
Definition 4 Resilience of a network







I[Xi(t) = 0] + I[Di(t) < d0, Xi(t) = 1]
 . (5.5)
Hence, aggregating over spatial variables, network topology and automated reconfigu-







r(t) exhibits the following properties:
1. Resilience is a property of a distribution network as a whole to survive large-scale
external disruptions.
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2. Resilience is a function of time that reflects temporal evolutions of failures and re-
coveries in a network.
3. Resilience shows the ability of a distribution network to resist failures and recover
rapidly.
4. Resilience depends on threshold d0 on failure durations. The failures that can recover
within d0 are considered tolerable in terms of the resilience metric. When d0 = 0, the
resilience metric offers no tolerance to delays in recovery, and only characterize the
ability of resisting to failures.
5.3.2 Parameters
The resilience metric can be characterized by the parameters of the model, i.e., non-stationary
random processes in Chapter 2. In particular, the resilience metric (Equation 5.5) can be
represented through a simple expressions owing to Transient Little’s Law [19],





λ f (v) Pr{D(v) > t − v}dv. (5.7)
The second term corresponds to the aging recoveries at time t. Let Pr{D(v) > t − v} =
1−G(t−v|v) and G(·|v) is the conditional cumulative distribution function of duration D(v).
The resilience can also be viewed as one minus the expected percentage of nodes in aging
recovery.
The above expression shows that given threshold d0, two parameters λ f (t) and G(d|t)
together determine the system resilience. A smaller failure rate results in more functioning
network nodes and thus a larger resilience. A higher percentage of infant recovery results in
a fewer aging recoveries and thus a larger resilience. Our model is determined by these two
time-varying parameters to the first moments (see Chapter 2). So is the resilience metric.
5.3.3 Threshold
Threshold d0 is a pertinent parameter that measures the degree of resilience in terms of
infant recovery. d0 can be determined by service requirements. For example, d0 = 24 hours
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is used by Distribution System Operators (power utilities) when it is acceptable to restore
a failure within 24 hours after severe weather strikes.
d0 can characterize a special value of E{N(t)} as follows. Consider a scenario where
failures occur suddenly and intensely due to severe storm, e.g., from a hurricane. That
is, λ f (t) characterizes impulse-like failures that increases sharply from a small value, λ0,
at time 0 (normal operation) to a large value, λm(t), in short duration 0 ≤ t ≤ t1. The
failure rate can then be written as λ f (t) = λm(t)(u(t) − u(t − t1)) + λ0, where u(t) is the unit
step function and λm(t)  λ0. Furthermore, consider a special case when infant recovery
dominates, i.e., G(d|t)→ 1 for d ≥ d0. This implies that all failures recover within duration
d0. The expected number of nodes in failures at time t is
E{N(t)} =

λm(0) (1 −G(t|0)) min{t, t1} + E{N0(t)} + o (min{t, t1}) , 0 ≤ t < d0,





λ0[1−G(t−v|v)]dv. The terms o(·) include the remnants when E{N(t)}
is approximated using the first-moment λ f (t). This expression shows that infant recoveries
occur within d0 after failures erupt. Here d0 is assumed to be larger than the duration of
failure process t1 for simplicity. In contrast, when aging recovery dominates, G(d|t)  1
for 0 < d < d0. The expected number of nodes in failure at time t is
E{N(t)} =

λm(0) min{t, t1} + E{N0(t)} + o (min{t, t1} + 1) , 0 ≤ t < d0,
λm(0)t1[1 −G(t|0)] + E{N0(t)} + o (min{t, t1}) , t ≥ d0,
(5.9)
where d0 > t1. This expression shows that aging recoveries do not start until delaying d0
from the eruption of failures.
In general, a failure-recovery process can be regarded as a combination of these two
special cases. At time t = 0, when a severe storm starts to impact a power grid, the
failure process dominates, and E{N(t)} increases rapidly. The recovery process starts after
occurrences of failures, and gradually dominates. When parts of the failures recover within
time duration d0 (i.e., as infant recoveries), there can be a sharp decrease in E{N(t)}. The
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remaining failures are restored with longer delays as aging recoveries. Therefore after
the sharp decrease, E{N(t)} may decrease at a slower rate. Following these scenarios, we
expect to see a sharp decrease after a sharp increase in the temporal curve of E{N(t)}. The
time delay between the two sharp changes can be chosen as d0, where
d0 = argmin
t
{λ f (t) − λr(t)} − argmax
t
{λ f (t) − λr(t)}. (5.10)
5.3.4 Numerical Results
We now study time evolution of resilience using the same data that is described in Chapter
2. First, we obtain an optimal threshold d0 for this power distribution network. The “opti-
mal” threshold here refers to a best partition between the infant and aging recoveries. Such
a partition is obtained empirically from data. Fig. 2(a) shows the comparison between λ f (t)
and λr(t). As we expected, λ̂ f (t) − λ̂r(t) first increased to its maximum value after the fail-
ures occurred, and then dropped to its minimum value. The duration between the maximum
and the minimum is 15.50 hours. Thus d0 = 15.50 hours is identified as the threshold. The
mixture component that on the left of the threshold line corresponds to infant recovery. In
total, 50.75% of the failures are categorized as infant recoveries.
The network resilience is then obtained through Equation 5.7 using the failure rate λ̂ f (t)
and distribution of failure duration ĝ(d|t). Fig. 2(b) shows the time evolution of network
resilience R̂(t). The dynamic evolution of resilience provides the following observations.
• Prior to the hurricane, no failures occurred yet, and the resilience was close to 1.
• A large number of failures then occurred and reduced the resilience to a lower level.
How fast the resilience decreased was measured by λ̃ f (t)− λ̃r(t + d0). The decreasing
speed reached the maximum after 16.45 hours since the first failure appeared. In the
meantime, the failure rate also reached the maximum.
• At 3 am September 14th, about 42.7 hours after the first observed failure (24.8 hours
after the landfall, and 26.25 hours after the failure rate reached the maximum value)
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the resilience reached the minimum value. There, 46% (214 out of 463) of total
failures were in aging recovery. The maximum reduction of resilience from that of
the normal operation was 214n , where n was the total number of nodes in the network.
At this time, the network was experiencing the most impact from the hurricane.
• After the minimum, the resilience increased when more failures were restored. The
impact from the hurricane was fading gradually. It took about 10.7 days for the
resilience to return to that of the normal operation from the minimum value.
The dynamic resilience metric R̂(t) resulting from the non-stationary model provides
following insights and understanding. First, the static resilience developed in the previous
works is overly-pessimistic for quantifying the resilience before and after the landfall of the
hurricane, where either few failures occurred or most failures recovered. The static metrics
are overly-optimistic around the landfall, where a large number of failures experienced
aging recovery. Second, the dynamic resilience metric quantifies joint effects of failure and
recovery processes, showing not only the failure rate but also the speed of recovery. Third,
the dynamic metric reveals the worst-case resilience of the network during a hurricane.
The dynamic resilience also identifies the time when the resilience reached the worst value,
showing an important period during a life-cycle of failures and recoveries. For example, the
network was the weakest in the duration (26.25 hours) between the failure rate reached its
peak value and the resilience attained the minimum, when most failures already occurred
but the restoration slowed down to aging recovery. When the network survived the weakest
period, the resilience began to improve due to recovery and few additional failures.
5.4 Spatiotemporal Resilience
The non-stationary spatiotemporal model in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 enable a spatiotem-
poral resilience metric for power distribution. Before the metric is defined, we first charac-
terize fast versus slow recovery based on concepts from infant and aging mortality [99].
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5.4.1 Definition
Definition 5 Infant (fast) and aging (slow) recovery: Let d0 > 0 be a threshold value. If
a node remains in either failure or outage for less than d0 duration, the node has infant
recovery. Otherwise, the node has aging recovery.
Using threshold d0, we can define resilience. Intuitively, resilience measures network-
wide performance from two aspects. One is for a power grid to withstand external disrup-
tions as much as possible. The other is to rapidly restore electricity service from failures.
Hence, aging recovery is a complement of these two characteristics [16]. Resilience is then
characterized as one minus aging recovery.
Definition 6 Resilience: Consider a sub-network in region Z with m number of disrup-















The second term corresponds to the expected percentage of aging recoveries at time t.
The aging recoveries here correspond to disruptions at time t that would not recover for at
least additional duration d0. For example, when w = f , λ
( f )
i(τ)dτ is the expected number of
disruptions occurred in (τ − dτ, τ]. Pr{D(w)i(τ)(τ) > t − τ + d0} is the probability for failures
to last a duration longer than t − τ + d0. The product is the expected number of nodes that
fail in (τ − dτ, τ] and do not recover at time t + d0, which is simply the number of aging
recoveries viewed at time t. The integral adds up all aging recoveries in duration [0, t] and
region Z. Hence, R(t,Z) is the expected percentage of nodes in region Z at time t which
are either in normal operation or recover within additional duration d0. The resilience thus
reflects temporal evolution of a network in response to severe weather.
5.4.2 Numerical Results
We now obtain the empirical resilience in terms of aging recovery using real data that is
described in Chapter 3.
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5.4.2.1 Vulnerable Time
In general, threshold d0 can be determined through failure and recovery rates (see Chapter
2 and [16] for details). Here in Figure 3.2(b), the empirical recovery rate clearly shows
that infant recovery occurred along with the majority of the failures, and is for the failures
that lasted less than 12 hours. After the infant recovery, there is a delay of 7.7 hours before
aging recovery occurred. Therefore, the threshold is d0 = 12 hours.
The resilience is calculated using d0 = 12 in Equation 5.11. As shown in Figure 5.3,
the resilience decreased from the normal operations along with the failure occurrences, and
reached a maximum reduction of 80.7% of total disruptions. The time at the minimum
resilience is 32 hours since the initial failure occurrence. This was the most vulnerable
time when the infant recovery already ended and the aging recovery was yet to begin.
The minimum resilience indicates that 80.7% of total disruptions needed at least another
d0 = 12 hours to recover. This is consistent to the resilience curve that it took up to 14 days
for all disruptions to recover.
What if threshold d0 is chosen differently? If d0 = 0 is chosen, the infant recovery
would be incorrectly considered as a part of non-resilience. The resulting resilience is
thus overly pessimistic with a maximum reduction of 83.7% rather than 80.7% in Figure
5.3. On the other hand, if d0 = 24 is chosen, the threshold falsely excludes parts of aging
recovery, resulting in overly optimistic resilience. Hence, identifying an optimal threshold
is important and shall be considered in the future work.
5.4.2.2 Vulnerable Areas
The resilience metric can also be used to identify vulnerable areas in a service region.
Figure 5.4(a1) and (b1) show the percentage reduction of the resilience at two time epoches:
4 hours before the landfall and the time of the minimum resilience. The regions with
more than 15% and 6% reduction of resilience appear as vulnerable areas for the two time
epoches. Figure 5.4(a2) and (b2) show the number of elephant failure neighborhoods at
the two times respectively. The vulnerable areas coincide with the regions that have a large
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number of elephant failure neighborhoods. This is consistent with the finding in Chapter 3
that elephant failure neighborhoods contribute to the majority of the disruptions and thus
a significant deduction of the resilience. Mice failure neighborhoods, however, are not
coupled with the vulnerable areas. These findings pose interesting directions for more
detailed study at the component level.
5.5 Conclusion
Despite the progress made to date, there are yet to be performance measures that incor-
porate all three intrinsic characteristics at the system level: Spatiotemporal non-stationary
failure-recovery; weather variables; service providers, customers and the community over-
all. Static metrics such as STAIFI and STAIDI characterize average behaviors of failures
and recoveries but not the spatiotemporal evolutions during a severe weather event. The
dynamic metrics recently developed include failure-recovery processes and impacts on cus-
tomers but not weather.
The following research questions relating to resilience metrics arise. First, what re-
silience metrics can encompass cohesively the three pertinent characteristics: Exogenous
weather variables, spatiotemporal non-stationary failures in the infrastructure, and recover-
ies of services for customers? Second, what approaches can lead to such resilience metrics
at the system-level, combining weather with failure-recovery-impact processes? Third,
what (additional) data are needed to evaluate resilience of the infrastructure and services?
Answers to those questions are expected to result from both development of system-
wide metrics and modeling that incorporates the variables from bottom-up. Extensive data
analytics are also needed to obtain values of newly developed metrics and to compare them
with the standards.
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Figure 5.4: Two snapshots of the resilience over the geographical area of the power dis-
tributions: (a) Reduction in percentage (of total number of disruptions) for resilience; (b)





In this dissertation, we have studied the fundamental problem of large-scale failures and
recoveries of power distribution systems under severe weather impact. We also investigated
the resilience of the power distribution systems from the dynamic non-stationary modeling
and the large-scale data analytics.
Quantifying resilience of the energy infrastructure and services under severe weather is
pertinent but understudied, as shown by the prior works. An immediate need is to under-
stand how resilient the energy infrastructure and services really are. Such understanding en-
ables fundamental enhancement of resilience beyond responding to severe weather. In this
context, unique characteristics emerge involving weather, failure and recovery processes
in the infrastructure and services, as well as impacts on community. These characteristics
are inter-related and impact resilience together. Therefore, modeling, data analytics and
resilience metrics need to be studied cohesively and at a large scale.
Models, when developed for separate aspects of the problem, are found incapable of
characterizing these unique properties jointly. Formulating the problem from bottom-up
through spatiotemporal random processes has the potential to characterize the interactions
of failure-recovery-impact processes. While the modeling framework extends to customers
as parts of community, roles of service providers and policy makers have been insuffi-
ciently studied. Relationships between weather variables and failures have been studied in
a separated context. Models are yet to be developed to incorporate all pertinent factors.
Data analytics, although at an early stage, have started to show promise in learning
knowledge about resilience. Data collected by DSOs, when sufficiently detailed, have
shown potential in identifying generic vulnerabilities of the infrastructure and services.
Large-scale and detailed data are particularly needed from multiple service territories. This
provides an opportunity for collaboration among DSOs, policy makers, and researchers.
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After all, resilience is for the benefit of the entire community. As big data is prospering in
many fields of engineering, the resilience problem presents a new application area.
Modeling lays a foundation for deriving resilience metrics. Widely-used IEEE stan-
dards are mostly developed for reliability in daily operations. Those metrics, when directly
extended to severe weather disruptions, are found to exhibit too much uncertainty to be
reliable. Resilience metrics developed from bottom-up can incorporate non-stationary spa-
tiotemporal failure-recovery-impact processes across multiple spatiotemporal scales. How-
ever, such metrics do not yet include weather variables. The metrics with weather variables
are developed in a separate context. An open issue is how to derive resilience metrics,
combining weather with the infrastructure and services.
Full of open issues and challenges, the problem of resilience provides a fertile ground
for technical study. Modeling, data analytics and metrics are still very much open for
development. Models and metrics are yet to include cohesively a wide range of exogenous
variables. More details from the infrastructure such as power flows may be needed in the
study of resilience.
In a broader context, while the methods discussed here focus on the power distribution
infrastructure and services under severe weather, the approaches for quantifying resilience
can be generalized to other dependent networks in a natural environment.
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APPENDIX A
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 4
A.1 Disruption Rate
Disruption rate λ̃(d)(t) is estimated from real data for both system disruptions and affected




[N(d)(ti) − N(d)(ti − τ)], (A.1)
where N(d)(ti) is the number of system disruptions or affected customers that occur prior to
time ti. τ > 0 is chosen as an interval of minutes. The procedure for estimating the rates is
provided below for completeness.
Algorithm 1 Estimating empirical disruption rate: Group all disruptions into m non-
overlapping time intervals {t0, t1, . . . , tm}.
1. Construct an empirical probability distribution using bootstrapping from data set
{(ci, vi); 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, where ci is the number of customers affected by system disruption
i and vi is the disruption duration. For simplicity, we choose a uniform distribution
for bootstrapping, where each sample is randomly drawn with probability 1n . Note
that bootstrapping requires independent samples, which is a reasonable assumption
at a time interval of a minute or longer.
2. At each bootstrap iteration k, draw a set of random samples of size n with replace-
ment. Group n samples into m non-overlapping time intervals {t0, t1, . . . , tm}. At each
time interval t j, estimate rate λ̃
(d)
k (t j) through Eq. A.1.
3. Repeat Step 2 K times and obtain a set of estimators {λ̃(d)1 (t j), . . . , λ̃
(d)
K (t j)} for 1 ≤ j ≤
m.
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4. The estimated rate at time t j is the sample mean, and the estimation error is the
sample variance. 













5. Obtain a confidence interval at time t j: δ(t j) = Φ−11−0.5α
√
ε(t j) at (1 − α) confidence
level, where Φα is the inverse of the cumulative distribution function of the standard
normal random variable. For example, Φ−10.975 = 1.96 for 95% confidence interval
when α = 0.05.








The following parameters are used: τ = 30 min, m = 5, 100 for the storm period; τ = 6
hours, m = 1464 in daily operations, the number of bootstrap iterations K = 100. The
number of samples (n) is given for each data set in Section SI1. Error bounds are computed
at the 95% (α = 0.05) confidence level. The estimated rates are shown in Fig. 4.1. Tables
A.1 and A.2 provide the average and maximum values of the estimated rates for system
disruptions and affected customers during the storm and daily operations. The accuracy of
the estimated rates is measured by NMSE values that are less than 10% for all four DSOs.
Both system and customer disruption rates had a significant increase during the hurricane.
The four DSOs experienced 1.5 to six new disruptions per minute on the average, and 224
to 561 new disrupted customers per minute during the hurricane. This demonstrates that a
system disruption affected a large number of customers.
Note that bootstrapping assumes independent samples. Given network state S (v), dis-
ruptions can be considered as conditionally independent. Because the conditional indepen-




To characterize the degree of impact in terms of affected customers by a local disruption,
we define a generalized scaling law as a mapping between the two probability distribu-
tions: W(x) : P(x). P(x) is a probability distribution for a disruption to affect more than
x customers. W(x) is the probability for a customer to be affected by a disruption that im-
pacts more than x users. Such a mapping is motivated by and extends the 80 − 20 scaling
rule [124], where W(x) ∼ 0.8 when P(x) ∼ 0.2. The 80 − 20 rule does not scale up or
down to power distribution systems that are by engineering design. Hence the generalized
scaling law obtains an empirical mapping from data for 0 ≤ W(x), P(x) ≤ 1 and a range
of x. Intuitively, if every disruption would affect the same number of customers, the map-
ping from P(x) to W(x) would be linear. Hence a nonlinear mapping is expected to signify
non-local and non-linear impacts from disruptions.
We define empirical probability distributions P̃(x) and W̃(x) as follows, where x is the
number of customers affected by one disruption.
Definition 1 Given data set {x1, x2, . . . , xn}, where xi is the number of customers affected
by the i-th system disruption. For x > 0,
P̃(x) =
∑n









P̃(x) and W̃(x) are estimated using bootstrapping methods; the procedure is given below
for completeness.
Algorithm 2 Estimating P̃(x) and W̃(x):
1. Construct an empirical probability distribution for bootstraping from data set {x1, x2, . . . , xn}.
For simplicity, we choose a uniform distribution, where each sample is randomly
drawn with probability 1n .
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2. At each iteration k, draw a set of random samples of size n with replacement. Com-
pute P̃k(x) and W̃k(x) for given x through Eq. A.2.
3. Repeat Step 2 K times to obtain a set of estimators {P̃1(x), . . . , P̃K(x)}, where P̃(x) is
the sample mean of {P̃k(x), k = 1, ...,K}. The estimation error ε(P̃(x)) is the sample
variance. Obtain confidence interval δ(P̃(x)) = Φ−11−0.5α
√
ε(P̃(x)) at level (1 − α).
4. Obtain W̃(x) and the error bound δ(W̃(x)) similarly to Step 3.
The following parameters are chosen in our implementation: α = 0.05 for the 95%
confidence interval; n = 1334, 1184, 1866, 1882 for the data sets from the four DSOs; K =
100 as the number of iterations for bootstrapping. Fig. A.1 shows the empirical generalized
scaling law W̃(x) : P̃(x), for the four DSOs during the storm and daily operations. Table
A.3 shows the NMSE that is less than 5%. Shown by Table A.3, P̃(x) = 20% disruptions
affected W̃(x) = 84%, 88%, 89%, 79% customers during the hurricane, where each of the
20% disruptions affected 74, 79, 105 and 107 customers respectively for the four DSOs.
More detailed information is provided in Fig. 4.2 through the histogram of the number of
affected customers. Hence a system disruption can affect a large number of customers. In
daily operations, a similar mapping exists between W̃(x) and P̃(x). However, each top-20%
disruption affected a smaller number of customers as shown through the histograms in Fig.
4.2(b ) and A.2 for the four DSOs respectively.
The generalized scaling law holds for certain number of affected customers. Consider
DSO 1 as an example. There are only a few samples of the disruptions that affected more
than 2,004 customers. This results in more than 10% estimation error for W̃(x) (Fig. A.1).
Hence, the disruptions that affected from 1 to 2,004 customers are identified to be the valid
range where the generalized scaling-law holds with the confidence 90%. Nevertheless,
the disruptions that affected more customers than those in this range are still informative
although not statistically sufficient (i.e., they may correspond to significant but rare failures
and should be examined individually).
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In summary, a generalized scaling law is obtained using bootstrapping from the data. In
a probabilistic view, the generalized scaling law provides a mapping between probability
distribution W(x) of interrupted customers and probability P(x) of disruptions, given that
each system-disruption affected more than x customers. A valid range of customers that
supports the mapping is obtained for each DSO during Super Storm Sandy and daily op-
erations. A valid range is also obtained with the confidence 90% for the empirical scaling
law to hold.
A.3 Probability of Disruptions
To quantify how Super Storm Sandy exacerbated the vulnerability, we define and estimate
probability P1(t) for at least one disruption occurring at time t (per minute). The empirical
probability P̃1(t) can be estimated as the frequency of the occurrences of disruptions. This
can be done in a straightforward fashion for normal daily operations. During the hurricane,
such a probability varied with time. Hence, the probability is estimated using the moving




[N(d)(ti) − N(d)(ti − τ)]}. (A.3)
Empirical probability P̃1(t) is estimated from real data using Algorithm 1. The probabilities
of the four DSOs in daily operations and during the storm are shown in Fig. A.3 and Table
A.4.
The probabilities for a disruption occurring at the hierarchy (primary-, secondary-
distribution and customer properties) are estimated similarly and shown in Fig. A.4 and
Table A.5.
A.4 Impact to Service and Cost
To understand the behavior of recovery, Figure A.6 shows scatter plots of system disrup-
tions. Each system disruption is associated with two variables, the number of customers
affected and the downtime duration.
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A.4.1 Recovery
To characterize interdependencies between failure- and recovery-processes, we focus on
the conditional probability density function f (d|z) of downtime durarion d given top z% of
disruptions for 0 ≤ z ≤ 1. Empirical f (d|z) is estimated as a histogram. In particular, f (d|z)
is obtained through counting the corresponding downtime durations given the ranking of
the disruptions in the interval [z − dz, z + dz]. We select dz = 0.015 to ensure sufficient
samples (i.e., 30 or more) for estimation.
The empirical mappings are illustrated through three-dimensional plots in Fig. 4.5 for
Super Storm Sandy and Fig. A.7 for daily operations. These plots reveal a general trend:
disruptions that affected the highest number of customers tend to be restored first. This
appears to result from an underlying recovery strategy that is used for both extreme weather
and daily operations, where power sources such as distribution substations are restored first,
followed by other components downstream.
A.4.2 Category of Disruptions
To further understand the impact of such trend of recovery on customers, we classify system
disruptions into two categories. Category 1 (C1) includes system disruptions, each of which
affected a relatively large number of customers and had a moderate downtime duration.
Category 2 (C2) includes the rest of the system disruptions, each of which either affected a
moderate number of customers or affected a large number of customers but recovered late.
Once classification is obtained, we can calculate the cost for the categories accordingly.
The cost can shed light on the effectiveness of recovery strategies.
Consider a pair of random variables (X,Y), where X is the duration and Y is the number
of affected customers of a system disruption. Consider two categories of system disruptions
C1 and C2 as defined above. A small percentage of samples on (X,Y) evidently belong to
C1 (or C2) based on prior knowledge (e.g., the disruptions that are known from the data to
have affect a large number of costumers and recovered early). These samples are labeled
samples with known category associations [41, 125]. Let Dl = {(xi, yi, αki)}li=1 be a set
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of labeled samples, where (xi, yi) is a sample on (X,Y) and corresponds to disruption i.
αk,i is a label for disruption i, where αk,i = 1 if the (xi, yi) is known to belong to Ck, and
αk,i = 0 otherwise, k = 1, 2. In contrast, there are system disruptions that are unknown
for the categories they belong. Let Du = {(xi, yi)}l+ui=l+1 be a set of unlabeled samples, where
disruption i is yet to be classified to one of the categories. Let γk,i be an assigned label for
such disruption i. Let Pk(x, y) be the posterior probability that a system disruption which
affected x customers and lasted y duration belongs to Category k (k = 1, 2). As there are
only two categories, P2(x, y) = 1 − P1(x, y). In this context, it suffices to classify labeled
and unlabeled samples into the two categories [41].




= βT v, (A.4)
where vT = (1, x, y, xy, x2, y2), and βT = (β0, β1, . . . , β5) is a set of unknown parameters.
The resulting posterior probability is
P1(x, y) =
1
1 + e−βT v
. (A.5)
As shown above, we choose the quadratic polynomial βT v for the logistic function
[125]. The quadratic polynomial is linear in β, enabling linear regression for learning the
parameters from data. The quadratic polynomial is nonlinear in variables (x, y), result-
ing in nonlinear decision boundaries between the two classes. Note that the choice of a
polynomial for the logistic function is appropriate as the variable space (x, y) is of low
dimensions [125].
Two additional constraints posed by our problem must be included in the logistic re-
gression. The number of customers for a disruption is lower bounded by a chosen value
a for being large; the disruption duration is upper bounded by b for being short, i.e.,
y > a, 0 < x < b if the corresponding system disruption belongs to C1.
Finding decision boundaries between C1 and C2 can now be casted as logistic regression
under constraints. Strictly speaking, logistic regression also need to minimize ||β|| that is
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L1 norm of the parameters. As our problem is of low dimensions, this term is not included.
Instead, we use partial data for validation. The algorithm finds parameters β by maximiz-
ing the log likelihood function log L(β|Dl,Du) given labeled and unlabeled samples under
constraints:









γk,i log Pk(xi, yi)
}
,
subject to yi > a, 0 < xi < b, if (xi, yi) ∈ C1.
(A.6)
The first sum is for the labeled samples. The second sum is for the unlabeled samples,
where γk,i is an estimated label for the i-th system disruption in Category k = 1, 2. The
algorithm implements a semi-supervised Logistic Classification Expectation-Maximization
(CEM) Algorithm [126] with extensions in this work to the quadratic logistic function and
the constraints. The algorithm is described below for completeness that follows the general
format given in [126].
Algorithm 3 Semi-supervised Logistic CEM Algorithm.
• Initialization: Obtain initial β(0) using labeled samples Dl.
• At the j-th iteration 1 ≤ j:
– Expectation-step: Estimate posterior probability P( j)k (x, y) for unlabeled sample
(xi, yi) to be in Class Ck (k = 1, 2) for i = l + 1, ..., l + u at the j-th iteration.
– Classification-step: For l+1 ≤ i ≤ l+u, assign unlabeled sample (xi, yi) to Class
Ck if P
( j)
k (xi, yi) = max[P
( j)
1 (xi, yi), P
( j)
2 (xi, yi)], and the constraints are satisfied:
yi > a, 0 < xi < b when the i-th system disruption is classified to C1. Compute





1 (xi, yi) ≥ 0.5
∧





2 (xi, yi) ≥ 0.5].
(A.7)
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Let D( j+1)l ,D
( j+1)
u be the samples with assigned labels at iteration j. Update the
likelihood function log L(β( j)|D( j+1)l ,D
( j+1)
u ).
– Maximization-step: Find new β( j+1) that maximize likelihood function
log L(β( j)|D( j+1)l ,D
( j+1)
u ). As in [126], Newton Method is used to update β( j+1):




∇ log L, (A.8)
where H is the Hessian Matrix, and ∇ is the gradient.
• If ||β( j+1) − β( j)|| < δ, stop the iterations. Otherwise, go back to Expectation-step.
δ > 0 is a chosen small constant.
Experimental setup To obtain labelled samples, we select a small number of system
disruptions which exhibit obvious characteristics of Category 1 or Category 2. For example,
disruptions affected more than 1,000 customers (i.e., top 1%, 2%, 4%, 1% disruptions for
the four DSOs) and recovered within 2.5, 1.2, 2, 30 hours (i.e., the first 10% recoveries)
were labeled as Categority 1. The disruptions that affected less than 10 customers (i.e.,
bottom 44%, 49%, 44%, 36% disruptions for the four DSOs) or recovered after 93, 19,
131, 241 hours (i.e., the last 10% recoveries) were labeled as Category 2. As a result, there
are 52%, 56%, 52%, 42% samples that are labeled in the four data sets.
Different service territories were impacted differently by the hurricane; so was recov-
ery. Thus the algorithm is applied to the data sets from the four DSOs individually. The
parameters must be chosen differently also. a in the constraint is selected so that Category
1 includes at most top 20% disruptions. Based on our findings from the generalized scaling
law (Fig. 2(a)), the following values can be chosen as a = 74, 79, 105, 107 customers (see
Table A.3). To select value for b, we note that Category 1 disruptions should be among
the first 50% recoveries. This results in b = 37, 4, 31, 141 hours for the four data sets
respectively. Furthermore, δ = 1e − 4 is chosen for the convergence of the algorithm.
Each of the four data sets is randomly partitioned into a training set with 80% samples
and a testing set with the remaining 20% samples. The training sets obtain the decision
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boundaries as shown in Fig.A.6 for the four DSOs. The test sets are then used to assess the
performance of classification. The accuracy of classification using the testing set is 94.4%,
97.6%, 98.4% and 93.3% for the four DSOs while that based on the training set is 100%.
Category 1 samples from the four data sets together consists of 9% of the total dis-
ruptions at Upstate New York. Those disruptions affected more than 98, 83, 117, 135
customers and recovered within 36, 4, 30, 122 hours for the four DSOs. This shows that
the decision boundaries are confined by but differ from the constraints. The remaining
samples are assigned to Category 2.
Category 2 includes a small fraction of disruptions that differ from the majority (i.e.,
0.3%, 1.4%, 0.4%, 0.3% for the four DSOs). The fraction corresponds to disruptions that
affected a large number of customers but recovered late. Such disruptions are first iden-
tified as those falling in the upper right quadrant defined by the decisions boundaries: At
downtime duration b, the corresponding numbers of customers at the quadratic decision
boundary are identified as 496, 336, 194, 498 for the four DSOs respectively. Among the
disruptions in this quadrant, we filter out those that correspond to “small devices” (i.e.,
fuses and other components at the secondary distribution and customer property) for DSOs
1, 2 and 3. The remaining disruptions are identified as “large/late” in Category 2 (i.e., those
that affected a large number of customers and recovered late). The rest in Category 2 are
the majority, referring to as “small” disruptions that either affected a moderate number of
customers or were commonplace devices. For DSO4 data set, we use only those disrup-
tions identified with information on device types for filtering out “large/late” samples. On
average, each small disruption in Category 2 affected 36, 29, 48, 37 customers for the four
DSOs.
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Table A.1: Estimated system-disruption rate at the 95% confidence interval.
Daily Operation Hurricane NMSE
Average Maximum Average Maximum
DSO 1 0.0086 ± 0.0094 0.0340 ± 0.0192 0.2611 ± 0.0701 2.0675 ± 0.1791 0.0169
DSO 2 0.0143 ± 0.0120 0.0726 ± 0.0269 0.2321 ± 0.0713 1.4536 ± 0.1552 0.0238
DSO 3 0.0166 ± 0.0132 0.1170 ± 0.0359 0.3655 ± 0.0880 2.3550 ± 0.1933 0.0154
DSO 4 0.0035 ± 0.0059 0.0301 ± 0.0182 0.3527 ± 0.0847 6.0349 ± 0.2149 0.0034
Table A.2: Estimated customer disruption rate at the 95% confidence interval.
Daily Operation Hurricane NMSE
Average Max Average Max
DSO 1 0.287 ± 0.561 2.810 ± 5.525 21.592 ± 17.445 223.534 ± 62.921 0.087
DSO 2 1.294 ± 2.155 15.878 ± 12.676 22.397 ± 12.635 225.372 ± 69.940 0.174
DSO 3 0.957 ± 0.730 7.189 ± 4.387 48.588 ± 28.830 455.085 ± 104.264 0.077
DSO 4 0.263 ± 0.572 4.728 ± 7.818 32.607 ± 13.157 561.383 ± 80.579 0.032
Table A.3: Estimated complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF). CCDF is
for affected customers W̃(x) and for disruptions P̃(x), where x is the number of customers
affected by one disruption. Estimation errors are at the 95% confidence interval.
W̃(x) P̃(x) ∼ 20% x (UB, LB) NMSE(P̃(x)) NMSE(W̃(x))
Hurricane
DSO 1 84.2% ± 2.5% 19.9% ± 1.9% 74(83, 66) 0.0279 0.0325
DSO 2 87.7% ± 2.7% 20.1% ± 2.4% 79(91, 68) 0.0447 0.0476
DSO 3 89.3% ± 1.5% 19.9% ± 1.9% 105(122, 89) 0.0189 0.0126
DSO 4 78.7% ± 2.9% 20.0% ± 1.8% 107(124, 99) 0.0213 0.0382
Daily
Operation
DSO 1 85.9% ± 1.2% 20.1% ± 1.0% 48(52, 45) 0.0113 0.0203
DSO 2 88.5% ± 0.8% 20.1% ± 0.7% 57(60, 54) 0.0068 0.0099
DSO 3 87.0% ± 0.8% 19.9% ± 0.8% 71(75, 67) 0.0065 0.0105
DSO 4 87.7% ± 1.9% 20.1% ± 1.8% 57(68, 51) 0.029 0.0413
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Table A.4: Estimated probability P̃1(t) of at least one disruption occurring for the four
DSOs. Estimation errors are at the 95% confidence interval.
Daily Operation Hurricane NMSE
Average Maximum Average Maximum
All
DSO 1 0.0071 ± 0.0085 0.0322 ± 0.0172 0.2246 ± 0.1317 1.0000 ± 0.0000 0.049
DSO 2 0.0150 ± 0.0123 0.0453 ± 0.0237 0.2412 ± 0.1302 1.0000 ± 0.0000 0.067
DSO 3 0.0119 ± 0.0113 0.0386 ± 0.0189 0.2910 ± 0.1362 1.0000 ± 0.0000 0.0497
DSO 4 0.0027 ± 0.0052 0.0144 ± 0.0128 0.1687 ± 0.0875 1.0000 ± 0.0000 0.0378
Top-20
DSO 1 0.0004 ± 0.0000 0.0049 ± 0.0068 0.0779 ± 0.0773 0.7558 ± 0.2154 0.1419
DSO 2 0.0028 ± 0.0051 0.0166 ± 0.0138 0.0652 ± 0.0631 0.6113 ± 0.1848 0.2113
DSO 3 0.0015 ± 0.0058 0.0088 ± 0.0094 0.0974 ± 0.0859 0.8287 ± 0.2171 0.1458
DSO 4 0.0007 ± 0.0000 0.0077 ± 0.0103 0.0840 ± 0.0805 1.0000 ± 0.0000 0.0549
Table A.5: Estimated probability P̃1(t) for a disruption occurring at the three system-
locations. The estimation errors are at the 95% confidence interval.
Network location Daily Operation Hurricane NMSE
MAX Average MAX Average
Primary
Distribution 0.2183 ± 0.0503 0.0144 ± 0.0126 1.0000 ± 0.0000 0.4068 ± 0.0890 0.0145
Secondary
Distribution 0.2593 ± 0.0637 0.0286 ± 0.0185 1.0000 ± 0.0000 0.4046 ± 0.1165 0.0198
Customer
Property 0.0132 ± 0.0090 0.0008 ± 0.0028 0.1601 ± 0.0441 0.0437 ± 0.0339 0.2
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Figure A.1: Estimated probabilities. W̃(x) is the probability for a customer to be affected
by a disruption that impacts x customets; and P̃(x) is the probability of such a disruption:
(a) during Super Storm Sandy; (b) in daily operations. W̃(x) and P̃(x) are estimated through
Algorithm 2. The shaded areas show the estimation error with the 95% confidence inter-
val. The difference between W(x) and P(x) illustrates the non-local impact of a system
disruption.
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Figure A.2: Generalized scaling law for DSO2, 3 and 4 during Super Storm Sandy and
daily operations. Types of disrupted devices are shown to the right of the number of affected
customers. The histogram shows the empirical probability mass function for the number of
customers from Super Storm Sandy and daily operations. The generalized scaling laws for
DSO1 is shown in Fig. 2(b).
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Figure A.3: Empirical probability P1(t) for a disruption occurring per minute during Super
Storm Sandy. The shaded areas show the error bars estimated with the 95% confidence
interval.
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Figure A.4: (a) Empirical probability P̃1(t) that a disruption occurs per minute for the
three network locations. The shaded area shows the estimation error at the 95% confidence
interval. (b) Ratio between the probabilities during the storm and that in daily operations



























































Figure A.5: Histogram of system disruptions at the three levels of the hierarchy during
daily operations. The color spectrum represents the percentages of disruptions that affected
a varying number of customers. The five major types of devices are plotted that correspond
to most disruptions. Horizontal axis shows the percentage of disruptions for each type of
device. Vertical axis shows the percentage of customers affected by each type of device.
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Figure A.6: Scatter plots of system disruptions for the four DSOs from the storm. Each
data point corresponds to a disruption. The horizontal and vertical coordinates are down-
time duration in hours and the number of affected customers for each disruption. Colors
represent different categories of disruptions. Category 1 (large/early) includes disruptions
that affected large numbers of customers and recovered early. Category 2 (small) includes
the disruptions that either affected relatively small numbers of customers or were small
devices (i.e., fuses and components at lower level of the system hierarchy). Category 2
(large/late) includes a small number of disruptions that affected relatively large numbers of



































































































Figure A.7: Probability distribution function f (d|z) of failure duration d given top z% dis-
ruptions for the four DSOs during daily operations. The number of affected customers is
given for each corresponding percentage of disruptions.
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